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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the determinants of the Chinese global economic 
footprint with a particular focus on Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). We argue that China’s recent 
economic growth has created a booming demand for energy resources and that this is a 
significant determinant for Chinese foreign economic engagement (FEE). Sub Saharan 
African countries are attractive targets for energy investment because they have many of the 
resources that China needs. At the same time, China has had a large impact on the 
development of these countries through its involvement in infrastructural development.  
The scope of the thesis is twofold: Firstly, we wish to see if energy resources attract Chinese 
foreign economic engagement. Secondly, we wish to see if there is a potential link between 
energy resources and the Chinese engagement in the infrastructure sectors of SSA countries.  
By using instrument variable approach on a pooled cross-sectional dataset we find that 
energy resources are significant in attracting Chinese foreign economic engagement, and that 
this attraction is stronger for SSA countries. We also find that energy resources attract 
additional FEE into the infrastructure sector in general, and especially for SSA countries.  
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1 Introduction  
After decades of communist regime and slow economic development, China has impressed 
the world with sustained economic growth, averaging 10% over the past 30 years (OECD 
2008). During the same period, the Chinese economy has gone from being nearly closed to 
having large scale foreign economic activity. It is today the second largest economy in the 
world measured by GDP.1 When a country that is home to about 20% of the world’s 
population2 undergo such a sharp change in a short period of time, this is bound to be 
noticed globally.  
The foundation of the transition of the modern Chinese economy was laid by the “Open 
Door Policies” initiated in 1978, which aimed at opening up the Chinese economy to the 
world. Initially, the focus of these policies was to attract foreign investment to China in order 
to increase domestic development and very few outward investments took place. Until the 
mid-1980s only a few selected state owned enterprises (SOE) were allowed to invest abroad. 
The restrictions were gradually loosened and by the end of the1990’s, also privately owned 
companies were allowed to apply for outward investment (Cheung and Qian 2009).  
At this time, the Chinese government also started to encourage and promote outward 
investments (OECD 2008). By the turn of the millennium, the amount of Chinese outward 
FDI displayed a sharp uprising when outward investment were further  promoted by the so-
called Go Global strategies (Cheung and Qian 2009). These policies encouraged outwards 
investment in order to support economic development and reform in China (Cheung et al 
2011).  
China has now become a main player among international investors. In 2013, China was the 
third largest outward investor globally, with foreign investments valued at $ 101 million, 
only beaten by the United States ($ 338 million) and Japan ($ 136 million) (UNCTAD 
2013).  
                                                 
1 Nominal GDP of $10 000 billion in 2014 (IMF 2014).  
2 China’s population estimated by the World Bank to 1,4 billion in 2013  
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In the context of Chinese outward economic engagement, its relationship with Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries has increasingly become a subject of public interest and 
controversy. There are no sure measures of how much Chinese companies have invested in 
China, but official figures suggest that annual flows have increased from $50 million per 
year in the early 2000s to around $ 400 million per year in 2004-2005 (Foster et al. 2009). 
Chinese governmental data estimated the flows in 2012 to be $2.52 billion in 2012. 
However, because the Chinese governmental data does not track funds that go through a tax 
haven before it reaches its final destination, this figure is likely to be heavily undervalued 
(Brautigam 2014).  
Along with increased FDI activities to the SSA region, Chinese companies have a large-scale 
presence as contractors in infrastructure projects in the SSA region. Overseas construction 
and engineering projects were an integrated part of the Go Global policies and have been 
actively encouraged by the Chinese government (Cheung & Qian 2009).  
After decades of low and unstable economic growth in most SSA countries, many economies 
in the region have recently had high economic growth rates3 and the IMF have forecasted 
that among the ten fastest growing economies globally in the period 2011-2015, 7 countries 
will be Sub Saharan African. Yet, despite this, the SSA region remains the least developed in 
the world and is associated with substantial risk for investments (The Economist 2012).  
Media and academia often speculate what China’s agenda for SSA might be. It has been 
argued that the relationship between China and the SSA region resembles the one China 
itself had with Japan during the 1990s, which turned to be a promoting factor for Chinese 
development (Brautigam, 2009). Other argue that the Chinese engagement in Africa is of a 
highly exploitive character, driven by a need to secure energy and mineral supply to fuel 
own economic expansion and consolidate its global authority  (Mbaye 2011).  
In this thesis, we will explore the determinants of the Chinese global economic footprint 
with a particular focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that China’s recent economic 
growth has created a domestic demand for energy resources such as oil and gas, and that this 
is one of the main motivations for the Chinese activities abroad. As we will develop further, 
                                                 
3 Ethiopia (8,1%), Mozambique (7,7%), Tanzania (7,2%), Congo (7%), Ghana (7%), Zambia (6,9%) and Nigeria (6,8%), 
annual economic growth rates in parentheses (The Economist, IMF 2011).  
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the Chinese government has a large impact on investment decisions of Chinese firms, hence 
governmental goals of securing energy resources will be reflected in their investment 
decisions.  
We employ a detailed dataset collected by the Heritage Foundation that contains project 
level information of investments and contracts from China to 121 different countries globally 
in the period of 2005 to 2014. The dataset contains detailed information on which sectors the 
transactions are directed to, which enables us to investigate how energy resources affect 
economic engagement in the infrastructure sector. We will in the following refer to 
investments and contracts combined as Chinese foreign economic engagement, abbreviated 
FEE4. 
The thesis is built up as follows: Section 2 gives a brief backdrop and present theoretical 
considerations. Section 3 presents the data employed. Section 4 describes the empirical 
strategy of the thesis. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 summarizes and concludes.   
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2 Motivations of Chinese foreign economic engagement 
2.1 Theoretical motivations for foreign direct investment 
Foreign direct investments have been subject to many studies during the last decades. A 
large literature has arisen attempting to explain the motivational factors to why companies 
invest abroad. Typically, three main motives for foreign direct investments are highlighted. 
These are referred to as market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and natural resource-seeking.  
Market-seeking investments include both investments to explore new markets as well as the 
strengthening of a company’s existing position in a foreign market (Voss 2011). Such 
investments are often conducted to facilitate trade and to secure access to distribution 
channels in markets that are attractive to the investor (Buckley, et al. 2007). Attractive 
market characteristics for investors with market-seeking motives are large markets or 
markets in growth (Voss 2011).  
Several studies have found that market-seeking motives are important when explaining 
Chinese investments to developed countries, but not in the case of developing economies 
(Buckley, et al. 2007, Cheung and Qian 2009, Kolstad and Wiig 2012). However, a study 
conducted by Cheung, et al. (2011) finds indications that market-seeking motives are 
important in the case of African countries as well. As early as 2008, an OECD-report 
claimed that Chinese manufacturers have started to view African markets as an important 
destination for their products. Many SSA countries have recently experienced periods of 
high economic growth, and the market potential of these countries is on its rise. Hence, we 
recognize that market seeking motives may be significant determinants for Chinese 
companies’ foreign economic engagement. We also believe that this motive might be more 
important over time, as the SSA economies experiences more economic growth and 
development.  
Efficiency-seeking investments aim to lower cost of doing business through realization of 
economies of scale or scope or by moving production to lower-cost locations. Such 
investments are normally conducted in countries with lower production costs than the home 
country of the investing company, such as the cost of labor, machinery and materials (Voss 
2011).  
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Buckley, et al. claimed in 2007 that efficiency-seeking motives were less important in 
explaining investment motives of Chinese firms, as China had comparatively low costs in its 
own home economy. However, the labor costs in China have increased sharply in recent 
times. Factory pay in Chinese industrial cities such as Henan and Guangdong has risen by 
103% and 80% respectively between 2008 and 2013 (China Labour Bulletin 2013). In 
contrast, labor costs in the SSA region are among the lowest globally (The Economist 2011). 
Many SSA countries also experience increasing unemployment as a consequence of a 
transition from agricultural based economy to a more industrialized one, which has caused 
an increased supply of blue-collar workers. Several African leaders try to establish favorable 
conditions for foreign investment, e.g. by facilitating the start-up process for foreign 
companies and establishing industrial zones with higher quality of infrastructure and 
institutions (Hamlin, Gridneff and Davison 2014). Cheung and Qian (2009) found that 
developing countries that had lower wages than China attracted more Chinese FDI, and 
attributes this finding to the Chinese seeking lower cost locations for their production. 
Because of these reasons, it is possible that Chinese investors are efficiency-seeking when 
investing in SSA countries. We therefore regard efficiency seeking motives to be a possible 
determinant for explaining Chinese foreign economic engagement in SSA.  
Resource-seeking investments aim at gaining access to technology, strategic assets or natural 
resources. Technology seeking investments can be motivated both by the desire to tap into 
existing knowledge bases or to participate in the development of new technologies, while 
strategic asset investments are made to access the distribution systems, brand names and 
managerial knowledge of local firms (Voss 2011). According to Cheung and Qian (2009), 
both the access to advanced technologies and managerial practices are important motivations 
for Chinese investments in countries that are more developed than China. Accordingly, we 
believe such effects to be more relevant for Chinese investments in countries that are on the 
same or higher development state than China itself and not so much for the Chinese 
economic engagement in SSA countries.  
Natural resource investments provide capital to the exploitation of resources and are 
typically motivated by the desire to capitalize on the resource rents or to secure the supply of 
scarce resources in the home economy (Voss 2011). We will place the focus of this thesis on 
investigating to which extent Chinese outward economic activities are driven be a search for 
resources. In the following section, we will develop our rationale for this.   
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2.2 The importance of natural resources 
The recent large-scale economic growth in China has sharply increased the country’s 
demand for natural resources. Since 2001, China’s energy consumption has been growing by 
approximately 13% per year. Much of this energy demand can be traced back to a domestic 
focus on energy-intensive industry, as steel and related metal products consumes up to 70% 
of the total energy in the economy  (IDE-JETRO 2009) 
In 2010, domestic crude oil production was only able to meet 50 to 55% of demand. By 
2020, this number is predicted to be down somewhere between 34 and 40%. Similarly, the 
coal shortage has been estimated to amount to 700 million by 2020 (IDE-JETRO 2009).  
In 2008, China was the second largest oil importer in the world. This is in contrast to the fact 
that the country was the largest oil exporter in East Asia only two decades ago (OECD 
2008). Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between Chinese production and consumption of oil 
in the period of 1986 to 2006. Since the early 1990s China has been a net importer of oil.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 China’s Oil Production and Consumption 1986-2008 
 
Source:  IDE-JETRO (2009) 
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The African continent is abundant in the resources that China needs. In fact, 10 percent of 
the world’s oil reserves are estimated to be located in Africa (Roxburgh, et al. 2010). It is 
also commonly believed that the exploration of Africa’s resource reserves is still so recent 
that a large bulk of existing reserves are lying undiscovered  (Kaplinski and Morris 2009). 
China has become increasingly reliant on natural resource imports from African countries. 
In, 2001, Africa’s share of Chinese total oil imports was below 23%. The number had 
increased to 29% in 2006 (Foster, et al. 2009). 
Recently, Chinese oil companies have also begun to bid for oil blocks in SSA countries, 
expanding their interaction to direct investments as well. Direct investments in resources that 
are important to the domestic economy may increase reliable supply of energy in the long 
run (OECD 2008), which may explain why the Chinese government encourages this instead 
of being reliant on imports. According to a report by the Japan External Trade Organization 
(IDE-JETRO 2009), the vast size of the Chinese population5 makes the country especially 
vulnerable if it is not self-sufficient by energy resources. A critical component of the 
Chinese Go Global policies launched at the beginning of the millennium is attempting to 
lock in resources that they would otherwise have to buy on the open market. Chinese interest 
for Africa is said to have been accelerated by the 9/11 crisis which highlighted China’s 
dependence on Middle Eastern oil supplies. At the time of the crisis, China obtained 
approximately 60 percent of its oil imports from the Middle East (IDE-JETRO 2009). 
The Chinese economy is subject to a high degree of government control, which is likely to 
affect the investment decisions of Chinese firms (Buckley, et al. 2007). Even though 
privately owned companies are increasing in share, most of the largest companies in China 
remain state owned. In the period 2004-06, the share of China’s outward FDI flows 
conducted by SOE’s accounted for 83.7 % of the total outflows (OECD 2008). Being state 
owned implies that the investment decisions made by these companies are not only 
motivated by profit maximization, but are also likely to be motivated by political objectives 
(Kolstad and Wiig 2012).  
The Chinese government also affects the investment decisions of privately owned firms by 
offering several financial incentives. These include access to below-market rate loans for 
                                                 
5 1.3 billion (World Bank 2013) 
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investments in priority sectors, tax incentives, direct capital contributions and subsides 
stemming from official aid programs (OECD 2008). Such incentive policies increase the 
profitability of projects in prioritized sectors and thereby tilt the investment patterns of 
Chinese companies towards these sectors. Priority projects are (i) projects focused on 
resource extraction, (ii) projects that support the exports of Chinese products, technologies 
and labor, (iii) R&D projects, and (iii) M&As that can benefit the Chinese when they are 
entering foreign markets (UNCTAD 2007). 
 
2.3  The Chinese involvement in African infrastructure projects 
In addition to conducting direct investments, Chinese companies have also become 
increasingly involved in infrastructure development in SSA countries, both as contractors 
and as financers. In 2009, Chinese contractors were involved in infrastructure deals in 35 
African countries, focused in the areas of power generation and transport (Foster, et al. 
2009). Most of the Chinese contracts in the power generation group are hydropower projects. 
In 2009, only 5% of the hydro potential in the SSA region was developed, so such schemes 
are seen as crucial contributions to the development of the SSA region (Foster, et al. 2009). 
In the transport sector, the building and rehabilitation of railways has been the main focus of 
the Chinese involvement. In 2009, Chinese companies were involved in the construction and 
rehabilitation of railways equivalent to 5% of the existing capacity in the SSA region 
(Foster, et al. 2009). 
In addition to carrying out construction projects in SSA, China is also offering finance for 
such projects. Chinese contractors have been winning contracts in the African infrastructure 
sector valued at $ 738 million over the period 2001-06. At the same time, the value of the 
Chinese commitments to infrastructure finance over the same period is estimated at more 
than $ 12 billion (IDE-JETRO 2009). The vast majority of infrastructure financing 
arrangements by China in Sub Saharan Africa is being financed by the China Export-Import 
Bank (Exim Bank)6. The bank has an official mission to carry out foreign economic, 
diplomatic and trade policies with a focus on overseas projects. Among other things, the 
                                                 
66 92 percent in the period 2001-2007 (Foster, et al. 2009). 
 9 
bank offers concessional and non-concessional loans for investment and construction 
projects abroad (Foster, et al. 2009). Concessional loan agreements entail that minimum 50% 
of the materials, equipment, services or technology involved in the project must be bought 
from a Chinese company. Also, it requires that the work is being performed by a Chinese 
contractor or exporter (Foster, et al. 2009).  
In some cases, infrastructural finance is coupled with natural resource development. As 
many African countries lack the sovereign guarantee needed to back concessional loans, the 
Exim-Bank is increasingly using the so-called “Angola model” when offering financing to 
African countries. A main trait of the model is that loans are repaid in natural resources 
(Foster, et al. 2009). The structure of the model is illustrated by figure 2.2 below. The 
beneficiary government can instruct Chinese contractors to engage in infrastructure 
development, paid for by the Chinese Exim Bank. In return, a Chinese company can start 
production in the country, and the resources extracted by the Chinese company are used to 
repay the loan (Foster, et al. 2009).  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Structure of the Angola model 
 
Source:  Foster, et al. (2009) 
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According to Foster, et al. (2009), the involvement of China as a main financier of African 
infrastructure projects is driven by economic complementarities between the two. The 
quality of infrastructure in Sub Saharan Africa lags far behind other regions, including other 
developing countries. The poor infrastructure in the region is hindering economic growth by 
increasing the costs of exports, hence making SSA countries less competitive in the export 
market. Also, production is made more difficult through unreliable power supply. The funds 
needed to close the infrastructure deficit in Africa are estimated to be as high as 5% of GDP 
in the region, with an additional 4% for maintenance and operations (Foster, et al. 2009). At 
the same time, China has one of the most effective and low-cost construction industries in 
the world and China is in great need of resources that are abundant in the African economy. 
Infrastructural improvements enhance the ability of African countries to export resources, 
which accelerates the economic development in these countries at the same time as it gives 
China access to the resources that it needs (Foster, et al. 2009). 
Chinese companies also sometimes bundle investments into natural resources with finance of 
projects like rails, ports and power that are needed to export these resources. These financing 
deals were in 2009 estimated to account for about 10 % of the total Chinese infrastructure 
financing (Foster, et al. 2009).   
According to OECD (2008) the Chinese government is actively using its aid programs for 
facilitating foreign direct investments. It has also been argued that the Chinese government 
offers to build politically important buildings and infrastructure in the expectation of 
winning political support for resource extraction projects.  
 
2.4  Empirical findings on the importance of natural resources  
In this section we give a brief summary of studies exploring natural resources as a 
determinant for Chinese investments. None of the empirical studies we have encountered 
have made an attempt to look for heterogeneities between SSA and non-SSA countries 
specifically. Only one study focus on African countries, but this study does not include 
investments to other countries for comparison. We have also not come across any studies 
examining the effects of natural resources on infrastructure projects. 
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 Buckley, et al. (2007) use official panel data on FDI approved by the Chinese government, 
covering 49 countries (22 OECD countries and 27 non-OECD countries) in the time period 
1984 to 2001. They find that Chinese FDI was significantly resource-seeking (using the ratio 
of ores and metals exports to merchandise exports as a proxy of natural resources), but only  
after 1992. They argue that the growth of the Chinese economy has created a need to secure 
important natural resources, which has led to an increased focus on such investments in 
recent times.    
Cheung and Qian (2009) use data on government approved Chinese outward FDI in the time 
period 1991 to 2005. They find that resource abundance (proxied by the ratio of fuels, ores 
and metals exports to total merchandize exports) is significantly important in attracting FDI 
for both developed and developing countries. They also conduct tests to determine whether 
investments in African countries are geared towards natural resources sectors, but they only 
find limited evidence for this. Their findings indicate that natural resources is only one of the 
motives for investing in these countries. However, when adding binary variables to capture 
different periods they do find indications of increased investments in natural resources from 
Chinese companies in the period after 1998. This could be a sign that the Chinese are 
catching up on their resource investments, but the authors do not conclude in one way or the 
other.  
Cheung, et al. (2011) use data from 1991 to 2007 on FDI approved by the Chinese 
government. This study is of special importance for our analysis, as it explores the 
relationship between China and Africa in particular. They find that natural resources 
(proxied by energy and metals output of the host country) do not impact the probability of 
receiving investments, but that Chinese investors tend to invest more money in oil producing 
African countries once such countries has been chosen as targets. They find indications of an 
increased focus on natural resources after the “Go Global” policies of 2002. The same 
authors also find that African countries that have interaction with China in the form of 
contracted projects and trade receive more investments. They argue that the number of 
contracted projects is an indication of the economic, and possibly ideological, ties between 
China and the host country because such projects must be endorsed by local authorities. 
These ties will facilitate Chinese investments. Also, the contracted projects can work as 
pioneer projects, giving the Chinese companies first-hand knowledge about the investment 
climate in the host country. 
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 Ramasamy, Yeung and Laforet (2012) examine the relationship between firm ownership 
and location choice, using a constructed dataset of investments made by listed Chinese 
companies in the time period 2006 to 2008 and dividing them into groups of SOEs and 
privately owned companies. They find that natural resources (proxied by the host country’s 
ore and mineral exports) attract investments from both SOEs and privately owned 
companies, but that privately owned companies tend to be more risk averse than SOEs and 
focus their involvement on providing value-adding services rather than exploiting the 
resources. SOEs invest in resource-rich countries that have higher levels of political risk.   
Kolstad and Wiig  (2012) use data provided by UNCTAD, covering outward FDI flows 
going to 104 countries in the period 2003 to 2006. They find that the effect of natural 
resources (proxied by the shares of fuels, ores and metals exports in GDP) depend on the 
quality of institutions and the characteristics of the host country. For non-OECD countries 
(79 countries in the dataset) the Chinese investors are attracted to natural resources, and 
especially so if the country has low quality institutions. They conduct tests to see if these 
results could appear due to a latecomer7 effect, but conclude that the most likely explanation 
for the results is that China takes advantage of countries with large natural resource reserves 
and weak institutions. For OECD countries, natural resources are not significant.  
2.5  Hypotheses 
Based on the review of existing literature and studies, we believe that resource-seeking 
motives are a significant driver for Chinese foreign economic engagement. As developed 
previously, there is a growing demand for energy in the Chinese economy. This, combined 
with the fact that the Chinese government has a substantial influence on Chinese companies’ 
decisions through direct ownership and incentive policies, translates into Chinese companies 
investing abroad.   
Adding on that Chinese companies are highly active in the Sub-Saharan region, we wish to 
examine whether Chinese FEE is relatively more attracted to energy resources in SSA 
countries compared to the world in general. 
                                                 
7 The possibility that China, being a latecomer in the markets for foreign direct investments, only have poorly 
governed countries left to choose from when conducting investments (Kolstad and Wiig 2012).  
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A special interest for resources in SSA can be grounded in the fact that SSA countries have 
much of the resources China needs. Furthermore, SSA countries comprise a group of the 
least developed countries in the world. It might therefore be easier for Chinese companies to 
get access to energy resources in these countries by offering lucrative financing deals 
bundled with investments. 
Our first hypothesis therefore state:  
(1) Chinese foreign economic engagement is attracted to energy resources. The 
attraction is stronger in SSA countries. 
 
In addition to Chinese companies’ engagement related to energy resources, there is also large 
scale Chinese engagement in the infrastructure sector, which seems to be especially 
important in SSA countries. For example, many African countries have made use of the 
Angola model as a financing source, which entails financing for infrastructure projects 
through Chinese official aid programs with backing in natural resources extracted by 
Chinese companies. 
These observations induce us to speculate about a potential link between energy resources in 
SSA countries and infrastructure projects conducted by Chinese companies in the region.  
If such a link exists it could have several potential explanations. Firstly, the Chinese 
government can offer finance for infrastructure projects in return for access to resources. 
Secondly, infrastructural development can be necessary to secure reliable export routes for 
the resources that China is investing in. As outlined above, infrastructure in SSA countries 
tend to be poorly developed, which increases the costs of extracting activities.  
Lastly, there could be an apparent link between energy resources and infrastructure 
development because Chinese companies invest where there is already a Chinese presence. It 
is possible that having close ties to a host country through a high number of contracted 
projects will attract additional investments to the same host. Chinese energy companies may 
prefer foreign locations where Chinese contractors are already present, and the other way 
around. If resource abundant countries are highly represented among countries receiving 
Chinese investments, contractors tend to end up in resource abundant countries as well. This 
would create a link between energy resources and infrastructure development that is not 
motivated by energy resources directly.  
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Hence, our second hypothesis states that 
(2) Energy abundant SSA countries attract Chinese economic engagement into the 
infrastructure sector.  
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3 Analysis of data 
3.1  Dataset and representability  
We employ a dataset collected by the Heritage Foundation (HF), covering Chinese economic 
activity in the period of May 2005 to July 2014. The details of the data are collected from 
corporate reporting and business media. Every transaction in the data set is backed by a 
source the Heritage Foundation claims to be fairly or highly trustworthy, such as the 
investor, the partner, Dow Jones or similar (Scissors 2014). This is different from data 
sources such as OECD and IMF, which uses governmentally reported FDI.  
The HF data differ from such data sources in several further aspects. A first major difference 
is the minimum value limit of projects included. The HF dataset includes only projects with 
a transaction value greater than $100 million, whereas sources such as UNCTAD and OECD 
also track smaller projects. Compensating for the HF data’s exclusion of smaller projects is 
the fact that the dataset contains information on sectors engaged in as well as names of 
companies involved.  
The Heritage Foundation also argues that by keeping their focus on large projects and using 
corporate level information sources, they are able to track the FEEs to its final destination. 
Tracking investment flows to its end destination is a major challenge, because a significant 
fraction of Chinese foreign investment flows are directed through tax havens. This makes it 
difficult to discern the ultimate destination of those funds. For example, official data from 
the Chinese government treats Hong Kong as a separate economy and official data register 
these investments to be to Hong Kong, although most of it just passes through Hong Kong’s 
economy. The purpose of much of such tax havens investment is so-called “investment-
roundtripping” of capital, a term that refers to the practice of taking money out of China and 
investing it back in China as foreign investment in order to qualify for certain tax breaks  
(Kolstad and Wiig 2012). Additionally to “roundtripping”, Hong Kong is often used as a 
“stopover” for Chinese funds going outwards (USCC 2011). Since governmental data tend to 
register only the first country the capital reaches after leaving the economy, such data 
underestimate Chinese investments in many countries to a large extent.  
In addition to investments, the dataset also contain contracts. Contracts refer to legal 
agreements between a Chinese company and a contracting partner in the host country. 
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Investments and contracts are approximately equally represented in the data material. The 
HF data tracks the full estimated value of intended transactions, which is different from 
governmental data from e.g. the Chinese and US government, which record annual flows. In 
this sense, HF reports intentions of economic engagements rather than actual flows. 
Transactions that do not go through are controlled for by characterizing them as troubled 
transactions.  
By comparing the HF with corresponding data material from UNCTAD, we find that the HF 
data is significantly more diversified across continents than the UNCTAD data. Due to the 
practice of only registering the first country that an investment reaches, investments in the 
three tax havens Hong Kong, Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands account for 79% 
of Chinese outward investments in 2009 (USCC 2011) Hong Kong alone received 67%8. 
Researchers using data from sources such as UNCTAD normally removes FDI going to tax 
havens in order to receive a more correct geographical distribution. However, by doing this, 
one is only left with roughly a third of the actual Chinese outflows. The aggregated value of 
FDI summarizes to $254 billion in the UNCTAD data and $297 billion in the HF data over 
the 6 year period. Dismissing the 67% of the FDI that first goes to Hong Kong leaves $84 
billion left to analyze when using the UNCTAD data.  
Graph 3.1 shows the distribution of foreign direct investments to different continents in the 
HF dataset compared UNCTAD in the period of 2005-2011. To be able to compare the two, 
we have only used the part of the HF dataset classified as investments9 and excluded Hong 
Kong from the UNCTAD data.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 A comparison between the HF investment data and the full UNCTAD dataset including Hong Kong can be 
found in the Appendix A1.  
9 A graph showing the total value of FEE going to different continents can be found in the Appendix A1.  
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Graph 3.1: Chinese FDI in the period 2005-2007  
  
FDI in million dollars in the period 2005-2011 according to HF 2014 (left) and UNCTAD 2013 (right). For 
UNCTAD data, Hong Kong is excluded. Source: Heritage Foundation (2014) and UNCTAD (2013).   
Comparing the two graphs reveals that the FDI towards America is overrepresented, whereas 
Africa and Asia are underrepresented in the HF data relative to the UNCTAD data.  
The HF data is also prone to biases, such as towards English and Chinese language sources, 
which are the dominating sources for the HF’s data collection. Accordingly, we may expect 
to see an overrepresentation of FEEs going into English speaking countries. As apparent 
from graph 3.1, America (including North and South) is indeed the continent that receives 
the highest volume of FDI in the HF data. Furthermore, as we will see later, the countries in 
our dataset receiving the highest amounts of total FEE are also English speaking (USA, 
Australia and Canada). This supports the suspicion that there is a bias towards USA and 
English speaking countries in the HF data. The difference could, however also be explained 
by the fact that the HF data only tracks projects above $100 million. It is plausible that 
Africa and Asia are underrepresented in the HF data relative to the UNCTAD data because 
they receive more small projects that are excluded from the HF data. 
As we hypothesize about the effect of energy resources and infrastructure projects, both of 
which can be quite capital intensive, our results might be affected by the HF’s focus on 
projects valued over $ 100 million. The exclusion of small projects in the HF data may also 
cause FEE by SOEs to be overrepresented in the dataset, as many of the largest Chinese 
companies are SOEs. This implies that the motives of the Chinese government might be 
more evident in our dataset compared to data sets containing small investments as well.  
 18 
Another potential bias relates to the political views of the collector. The Heritage Foundation 
is a conservative think tank that seeks to “formulate and promote conservative public 
policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, 
traditional American values, and a strong national defense” (Heritage Foundation 2014). 
This might cause a focus on certain geographical areas, e.g. the US, in order to strengthen 
evidence for its own political agenda. 
The HF’s use of media and corporate reporting may also be questionable, as one cannot be 
sure about the trustworthiness of such sources. There could also be systematic differences in 
reporting, e.g. that reporting in developing countries may be of poorer quality compared to 
developed countries. 
3.2  Descriptive analysis  
Our dataset contains 1234 investments, contracts and troubled transactions in the time period 
2005-2014. There are 134 different countries in the data, whereof 32 are SSA countries. 
South Africa is not included in the SSA group, due to its development level being 
significantly different from the remaining countries in the region. 
 
Top recipient countries 
The top 10 host countries based on FEE volume are given in table 3.2 below. The right part 
of the table show the top host countries in the world and the left part show the top host 
countries in Sub Saharan Africa. In the Sub Saharan Africa ranking we have added the 
country’s total world ranking as well as the ranking in the SSA-group.   
According to the BP dataset, all the countries on the world top 10 list have large energy 
reserves. Russian Federation and Iran are ranked as number 1 and 2, USA and Nigeria are 
number 5 and 6, and the other countries on the top 10 list follow closely behind. For SSA 
countries, the same pattern appears. Nigeria, Angola and Chad, all of which have high ranks 
on the top 10 list for SSA countries, have considerable energy resource reserves.  
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Table 3.2: Top 10 host countries based on FEE volume (numbers given in US $  
millions)  
The World Sub Saharan Africa 
World 
rank 
Country Value of FEE World 
rank 
SSA 
rank 
Country Value of FEE 
1 USA   111 810 7 1 Nigeria 31 000 
2 Australia   105 130 17 2 Ethiopia 16 150 
3 Canada   44 770 21 3 Angola 15 220 
4 Iran  42 370 28 4 DRC 10 930 
5 Brazil  34 460 33 5 Guinea 9 210 
6 Indonesia  31 420 40 6 Mozambique 8 110 
7 Nigeria  31 000 43 7 Chad 7 490 
8 Britain  25 010 45 8 Uganda 7 060 
9 Kazakhstan   24 880 46 9 Kenya 6 970 
10 Russian 
Federation  
23 380 49 10 Zimbabwe 5 590 
Source: Heritage Foundation (2014) 
According to Cheung og Qian (2009), Chinese companies have had an increased focus on 
developing countries as targets for their foreign investments. However, according to our 
dataset, USA, Australia and Canada are the three countries receiving most FEE from China, 
measured in value, which are all among the most developed countries in the world10. 
Looking further into this, we find that 11 % of Chinese FEE go to the 16% countries in the 
world that are characterized by low-income. 16 % go to the 23% countries characterized as 
lower-middle income countries, 30 % to the 26% countries characterized as upper-middle 
income countries and 43 % go to the 35% countries characterized as high income countries. 
Hence, according to our data, 73% of Chinese FEE goes to upper-middle income or high 
income countries. Since the World Bank characterizes low and middle-income countries as 
“developing” countries, a higher share of the Chinese FEE does indeed go to developing 
countries. However, it is interesting to note that according to our data, 73% of Chinese FEEs 
go upper-middle income or high income countries. This might be an indication of market-
seeking motives among Chinese investors. According to our data, the investment volume 
going to SSA countries are generally smaller than the rest of the world. SSA countries 
comprise 24 % of the HF dataset, but receive only 16 % of the total investment volume. 
Nigeria is the only SSA country among the top 10 recipient countries worldwide.   
 
                                                 
10 According to World Bank classifications (World Bank 2014). 
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Sectorial distribution of investments 
As already mentioned, one desirable trait with the investment tracker data is its detailed 
information on sectorial distribution of transactions. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show relative 
investment value of sectors for non-SSA and SSA countries respectively. The three sectors 
attracting most Chinese FEE in both country groups are energy, metals and infrastructure. In 
the non-SSA group, energy is the largest sector. Metals also receive a large bulk of the 
investments, hence the two extractive sectors combined attract over half the FEE volume in 
non-SSA. In the SSA group, the infrastructure sector is by far the largest sector, receiving 
almost half of the FEE volume. About one quarter of the FEE goes to the energy sector, and 
combining energy with metals the extractive sectors account for approximately 45 % of the 
FEE volume. Only 7 % of the FEE volume in SSA goes to sectors outside of the three main 
sectors, compared to 18 % for non-SSA countries, suggesting that Chinese companies have a 
more narrow focus in SSA countries compared to non-SSA countries.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The sectorial distribution of non-SSA FEE 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation (2014) 
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Figure 3.2: The sectorial distribution of SSA FEE 
 
 Source: Heritage Foundation (2014) 
 
The large FEE volume going into the energy sector is in line with our first hypothesis stating 
that Chinese investors are attracted to energy resources. However, there are more energy 
investments in non-SSA countries, which is inconsistent with our belief that the effect of 
energy resources will be stronger for SSA countries. We have presented one line of 
argumentation for our second hypothesis, which suggests that Chinese investors conduct 
infrastructure development to facilitate or access energy resources in the energy sector in 
SSA. In this regard, it is somewhat surprising that infrastructure receives almost twice the 
FEE volume that the energy sector does. In the following we will look closer at the 
subsectors within the energy and infrastructure sector. This can help us get a better image of 
what the Chinese FEE to these sectors are directed towards.  
 
The infrastructure sector 
The smaller circles of figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the distribution of FEEs among different 
infrastructure subsectors. Hydro, rail, real estate and autos are the main subsectors in both 
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SSA and non-SSA countries. The subsectors rail and hydro are relatively large in SSA 
countries, which is consistent with the common perception.  
81% of the FEE volume into infrastructure projects in the SSA group are one a contract 
base11, suggesting that these are construction projects.  
For non-SSA countries, the share of contracts in the infrastructure sector is 57%, but these 
countries receive considerably more investments (31%) than SSA countries. Investments are 
particularly frequent for projects related to aviation, shipping and real estate in non-SSA 
countries, where approximately half of the FEEs are investments. Hence, Chinese companies 
in the infrastructure sector in SSA are more often construction companies conducting 
engineering projects. By contrast, in non-SSA countries they are often investors.  
 
The energy sector 
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of FEE among the energy subsectors in non-SSA and SSA 
countries. The energy sector contains the subsectors oil, coal, gas, electric, alternative and 
unspecified. In non-SSA countries, unspecified subsectors constitute an especially large bulk 
of the FEE volume (37%). A little more than a quarter of the energy FEE in non-SSA goes to 
the oil sector. The rest of the FEE is approximately evenly distributed between the 
subsectors gas and coal, with gas receiving a few percentages more than coal. Only 3% goes 
to the subsector alternative energy. For SSA countries, oil is by far the largest sector, 
receiving approximately half of the energy FEE. Gas and coal receive about 20% each and 
the rest go the unspecified and alternative subsectors. That a relatively small share of the 
energy FEE in the SSA group goes to unspecified subsectors, might be an indication that the 
projects in SSA are more narrowly orientated i.e. easy to classify compared to FEE into the 
non-SSA group. 
 
 
                                                 
11 SSA: 81 % of FEE value is contracts, 14 % is troubled transactions and 5 % is investments. For non-SSA 
countries only 57 % is contracts, 12 % is troubled transactions and 31 % is investments.  
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Figure 3.3: The distribution of FEE in the energy sector 
  
Source: Heritage Foundation (2014) 
 
We would have liked to closer examine infrastructure FEE that is directly linked to energy 
resource extraction, as we believe this might be a motivation for Chinese involvement in 
SSA countries. However, the subsectors specified in the infrastructure sector are exclusively 
related to transport and there are no subsectors directly relatable to resource extraction, e.g. 
the construction of pipelines and refineries. Roads, shipping and rails are important 
facilitators for the utilization of commodities, but they can also be related to the local needs 
of country and have no linkages to resource extraction. Without knowing the exact locations 
of these projects we cannot know their true purpose. 
We suspect that projects directly linked to resource extraction are registered as energy 
projects in our data. About half of the FEE volume in the energy sector is investments and a 
quarter is contracts12. It seems plausible that contracts related to oil, gas and coal could be 
engineering projects related to the construction of infrastructure for resource extraction. 
However, since we cannot know this for sure without more detailed information we can only 
speculate.   
                                                 
12 The total value of FEE going to contracts and investments is: Worldwide and non-SSA: Investments 53 %, contracts 27 
% and troubled transactions 20 %. SSA: Investments 56 %, contracts 23 % and troubled transactions 21 %.  
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SOE presence 
According to our dataset, 84% of Chinese companies engaging in SSA are state owned 
enterprises, whereas the equivalent number for non-SSA countries is 67%13. This finding 
may suggest that projects executed in SSA to a higher extent reflect objectives by the 
Chinese government. Given that there are relatively more projects in energy resources in 
SSA, the finding may also reflect a higher share of SOEs among Chinese utility companies 
in general.  
                                                 
13 However, SOEs might be overrepresented in our dataset, given that only projects above $ 100 million are 
included. 
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4  Empirical strategy 
In this section we will first outline our model, before we follow up with an overview of our 
variables. Lastly we will discuss some potential econometric issues and their remedy.  
 4.1  The model 
Our basic specification of our empirical model is 
 
Our dependent variable includes investments, contracts and troubled transactions.14 We use 
control variables according to standard models for foreign FDI (in accordance with e.g.  
Buckley, et al. 2007, Cheung and Qian 2009, Harding and Javorcik 2007). The proxies used 
for the main independent variables and the sources of data are presented in table 4.1: 
Table 4.1: Independent variables 
Variable Proxy Theoretical justification Source 
Energy resources  Oil and gas 
proved reserves 
Resource seeking British Petroleum 
Statistical Review  
Controls    
Landlocked Binary variable Transaction costs CEPII GeoDist database 
Distance Distance 
between China 
and the host 
country 
Transaction costs CEPII GeoDist database 
Market opportunities GDP Market seeking World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Macroeconomic 
stability 
GDP deflator Risk World Bank Development 
Indicators 
Institutions Polity IV Transaction costs The Center for Systemic 
Peace 
 
                                                 
14 Troubled transactions are included to because they reflect the motivations of Chinese investors. 
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Energy resources  
Energy resource endowment is our main variable of interest and we have chosen to proxy 
this using data on energy reserves published by British Petroleum. We have included the 
proven reserves of oil and gas, merged into one variable, where gas levels are measured as 
oil barrel equivalent15. This variable reflects the geology of the host countries and captures 
the long-term potential of production.  
Using a measure for energy resources that attempt to directly reflect a country’s geology is 
in contrast to several previous studies on Chinese determinants of FDI, where instead 
measures for natural resource exports are used. The rationale for using exports is based on 
the presumption that the rents, directly reflecting the profitability of certain investments, are 
the decisive component for investors (Kolstad and Wiig 2012). However, as developed in 
section 2, Chinese companies are predominately state-owned and are therefore likely to have 
a long-term perspective and be less risk-averse than other investors16. This implies that 
Chinese investors might be less concerned with resource rents that yield short-term profits 
and more concerned with building up a business relationship in regions that have large 
resource reserves in order to secure supply of these resources in the future.   
In addition to looking at the isolated effect of energy resources on Chinese FEE, we also 
interact energy resources with a SSA dummy variable. This is to examine whether China’s 
interest in natural resources is stronger in SSA countries than countries outside of SSA. We 
also use the SSA variable to explore general differences between SSA and non-SSA 
countries.  
 
                                                 
15 The conversion from cubic meters to barrels was done using the following equation: 1 cubic meter LNG 
(  = 6.6 barrels of oil.  
16 This is in line with argumentation presented by Kaplinski and Morris (2009). 
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Control variables 
In line with gravity models of FDI we include landlockedness and geographical proximity17 
between China and the host country. Both are assumed to have a negative impact on 
investments as they increase transportation costs. Some observers suggest that geographical 
proximity is becoming increasingly important in explaining FDI flows, as large amounts of 
bilateral flows between countries in the same regions tends to be observed more frequently  
(UNCTAD 2007). These variables have been found to be significantly negative in several 
studies examining FDI determinants (e.g.  Cheng and Ma 2010, Ramasamy, Yeung og 
Laforet 2012, Kolstad og Wiig 2012).  
As a proxy for the market size of the host economy we use GDP from the World Bank 
Indicators18. GDP measures as proxies for market-seeking motives are found to be positively 
correlated with Chinese FDI in a number of studies, e.g. Kolstad & Wiig (2012), Buckley et 
al (2007), Cheng & Ma (2010) and Cheung & Qian (2009).  
To control for financial stability, we use a GDP deflator as proxy, taken from the World 
Bank Indicators. Lower inflation indicates financial stability and thereby lower risk. It is 
therefore generally associated with increased inflow of FDI. Some authors do, however, 
argue that in the case of Chinese firms, the relationship might be different. Buckley, et al. 
(2007) find a positive relationship between higher inflation rates and Chinese FDI inflows to 
a country. They argue that countries experiencing moderate inflation might be more 
attractive to Chinese firms because inflation often accompanies economic growth. Also, 
Chinese companies might be more willing to invest in economically unstable environments 
because their experiences in their own home environment have made them especially 
equipped to do so (Buckley, et al. 2007). 
In order to control for institutional quality we use the Polity IV index, developed by the 
Center for Systemic Peace. The Polity IV index attempts to measure the level of democracy 
in a given country, including general political participation, openness, and political 
                                                 
17 We use a weighted distance measure based on bilateral distances between the largest cities in the two 
respective countries, weighted by the share of the overall country population living in these cities.  
18 We would have liked to control for GDP per capita as well as a control for the efficiency-seeking motive, as 
this measure captures the effect of the wage levels of a country. Including both GDP and GDP per capita 
introduce multicollinearity issues, we therefore dropped GDP per capita. 
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competitiveness and extent of checks on executive authority (Center for Systemic Peace 
2013)19. Institutions of high quality in the host country are assumed to positively influence a 
country’s attractiveness for FDI as it reduces the risk and costs of doing business. It is also 
associated with countries that have high economic growth (Walsh og Yu 2010). However, 
several studies have found that Chinese investors are attracted to poor institutions in the host 
country (Kolstad og Wiig 2012, Buckley, et al. 2007). A possible explanation for these 
findings is that Chinese investors have a comparative advantage when investing in countries 
with weak institutions because it has experience with corruption and capital market 
imperfections in its own home market (Kolstad og Wiig 2012). 
 
4.2 Econometric issues  
The choice of econometric approach  
We have chosen to use a pooled cross-sectional approach for our regression analysis by 
combining observations on single transactions from the period 2005-2014. We will not 
regard time in our study as we are interested in the cross-sectional variation rather than time-
variation.   
 
Endogeneity issues  
Endogeneity occurs when one or more of the explanatory variables are correlated with the 
error term. In the presence of endogeneity, all coefficients included in the regression may be 
biased. A trustworthy treatment of the sources of endogeneity is therefore critical.  
There are three main sources of endogeneity. Firstly, endogeneity may arise when at least 
two variables are jointly determined and simultaneously affecting each other. This form of 
                                                 
19 Ideally, we would have liked to use a more general measure for institutions that included institutions in a 
more broadly meaning of the word to catch effects of e.g. educational, religious, juridical and cultural 
institutions. Such a measure is, however, difficult to find. We tried including the Rule of Law indicator from 
the World Bank but had to drop this because if was highly correlated with GDP. 
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endogeneity is called reverse causality, as the independent variable determines one or more 
of the explanatory variables at the same time as they determine the independent variable 
(Woolridge 2013). 
A second main source of endogeneity is when a variable that has predictive power on our 
dependent variable and is correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables is omitted 
from the model. The omitted variable will then be reflected in the error term and cause the 
error term to be correlated with the explanatory variable, with which the omitted variable is 
correlated (Woolridge 2013).  
Thirdly, endogeneity may arise when there are measurement errors in our dataset. Both the 
inaccurately measured variable and the error term will be dependent on the “measurement 
noise” introduced by the measurement error. They will therefore be correlated and thereby 
introduce bias in the regression results (Woolridge 2013). 
 
Endogeneity of control variables 
Whereas the explanatory variables SSA, landlocked and distance to China are strictly 
exogenous, the variables GDP, inflation and institutions are likely to be subject to reverse 
causality from the dependent variable when using estimates from the same time period. GDP 
can be influenced by FEE because increased investments and construction activity is likely 
to increase the income of a country. Inflation can be influenced as an increase in FEE may 
positively influence demand, and thereby also put upward pressure on a country’s inflation 
rates. Inflows of FEE may also influence the quality of institutions, e.g. through increased 
economic stability. To reduce endogeneity caused by reverse causality, we use variables one 
year before our estimation period20.  
                                                 
20 This solution is somewhat imprecise, as especially inflation level and GDP may vary substantially within a 
period of ten years previous to our estimation period. A possible alternative would have been to use an average 
value of the variables over time (in line with the study conducted by Kolstad & Wiig, but we regard the 
solution of using only 2004 to be a satisfactory one.  
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However, control variables might also be subject to omitted variable bias if there are 
unobservable factors captured in the error term influencing both the level of FEE and the 
control variables. Lagging the variable does not correct for this (Woolridge 2013).  
 
Endogeneity of energy resources  
In the relationship between Chinese FEE and energy resource endowments, we might find all 
the three common sources of endogeneity mentioned above.  
A first potential source of endogeneity in the energy resource variable is reverse causality. 
As is apparent from the graph, proven oil reserves have more than doubled between 1980 
and 2012, growing from about 60 billion barrels in 1980 to 130 billion barrels in 2012. 
Proven gas reserves have nearly doubled within the same period. Although there has been an 
impressive increase in the known resource endowments of Sub-Saharan Africa over the last 
decade, the region still remains undiscovered in terms of natural resources (Kaplinski and 
Morris 2009). Figure 4.1 illustrates that the discovered reserves can be quite dynamic. 
Because energy resource discovery can require intricate technology and knowledge, new 
resource reserves tend to be disclosed as a country develops. Increased amounts of FEE can 
aid the development of a country and contribute to the discovery of resources by providing 
capital to the host economy. Similarly, economic activities introduced by Chinese FEE may 
increase extraction rates and thereby contribute to depletion of energy resources. Hence, 
there could be reverse causality issues between Chinese FEE and the proven reserves of 
energy resources.   
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Figure 4.1 Proven reserves of oil and gas 1980-2012 
 
Source: British Petroleum (2005) 
 
If reverse causality was the only source of endogeneity, it would have been sufficient to use 
predetermined variables to control for the endogeneity. Yet, solely using predetermined 
variables does not correct for endogeneity caused by omitted variables and measurement 
errors (Woolridge 2013).  
Omitted variable bias refers to endogeneity caused by unobservable omitted variables that 
affect both Chinese foreign engagement in the estimation period and the known level of 
resource endowments. To better understand what the omitted variable bias entails, one can 
contemplate on the effects e.g. a research institution may have on both attractiveness for FEE 
as well as the known level of energy resources. Establishment of research institutions will 
increase the general level of education in the economy. This may cause the population to 
improve their infrastructure, crime rates to fall, quality of institutions and sophistication of 
economic activities to increase and similar effects. All these effects are likely to increase the 
country’s attractiveness as host country for FEE today. At the same time, a higher education 
level is also likely to cause the country’s resource endowments to be better discovered, 
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through increased competence and enhanced technology, more skilled engineers and 
geologists in the country and similar. 
Such a variable, which has influence on both explanatory variables as well as the dependent 
variable, will be reflected in the error term and introduce a bias. Other variables that are 
likely to influence both FEE and the known level of natural resources are culture, conflicts, 
political changes and several more. It is obvious that it is impossible to include all such 
relevant variables in our model21. 
Cheung and Qian (2009) address endogeneity due to omitted variables, by including country 
fixed effects in a panel data estimation of determinants of Chinese FEE. If there is reason to 
believe that the omitted variable does not change over time, using fixed effects estimation 
cause time invariant country specific omitted variables to be controlled for  (Woolridge 
2013). However, controlling for fixed effects in our estimation would suck up information 
about effects of resource endowments on a country’s attractiveness for FEE that we wish to 
obtain by using our explanatory variables. In addition, the methods possible when using 
panel data do also not solve the problem of endogeneity caused by time-varying omitted 
variables that are correlated with the explanatory variables (Woolridge 2013). Using fixed 
effects to control for endogeneity is therefore not a reasonable option in our case.  
Another solution would be to use a proxy for the omitted variables, but the range of possible 
influencing variables that are omitted in our case makes this an infeasible option. Adding 
control variables could even cause our model to be over specified, which would influence 
the variance of our coefficients and thereby also the confidence intervals and significance 
level (Woolridge 2013). 
The energy resource variable may also contain measurement errors. If an explanatory 
variable is measured with random errors additive to the true values it will induce correlation 
between a wrongly measured variable and the error term. This will in turn introduce bias 
towards zero – attenuation bias – of the coefficient of wrongly measured variables and biases 
in unknown directions of other variables (Woolridge 2013).  
                                                 
21 We attempt to control for institutions in our regressions, but our variable only includes the Polity IV variable that controls 
for level of democracy. Other possible variables controlling for institutions, such as the World Bank’s Rule of law-measures 
and the HDI-index, are subject to collinearity issues when included together with variables such as GDP.  
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To which extent this applies to the data on energy resources leads us to a discussion on how 
the data is collected. As we use public data for energy resources, we can assume that these 
represent a minimum of what is known and that it is quite likely that big investors have more 
information than the public information. In effect, the wrongly measured variable will be 
correlated with the error term and hence introduce bias.   
In the presence of endogeneity we could take the bias into account when interpreting the 
coefficients if we knew its direction. The direction of the bias is dependent on the correlation 
with the error term, so that e.g. a positive relationship gives an upward bias, which would 
overestimate the impact of natural resources on FEE. However, given on the several 
potential sources of endogeneity the direction of the bias will be impossible to disclose.  
4.3 The instrument variable approach  
A suitable way to deal with the potential issues of endogeneity of the sources outlined above 
is to use an instrument variable (IV) method of estimating our regression model. The 
principle of the IV method is finding a variable that is correlated with the potentially 
endogenous explanatory variable that we wish to replace. We then use the variance between 
the instrument variable and the independent variable to construct a new variable that will not 
be endogenous to the system. Hence, the idea is that we circumvent endogeneity by 
constructing a replacement for our explanatory variable that is based on its relationship with 
an exogenous variable (Woolridge 2013).  
The main difficulty related to the instrument variable approach, is to find a variable that is 
suitable as instrument. A good instrument must formally fulfill two restrictions. Firstly, the 
so-called relevance criterion states that the instrument must be relevant for explaining the 
endogenous variable we wish to replace. Secondly, the co-called exclusion criterion states 
that the instrument must be exogenous to the structural equation. We have chosen energy 
resources from 198022 as our instrument and will discuss its validity as an instrument in the 
following.  
                                                 
22 For the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, the data is from 1998, since the resources in these regions are 
significantly large and there were no available results from 1980. If these regions had been excluded from the 
natural resource measure, we would run the risk of generating wrong results.   
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The relevance criterion can be expressed mathematically as ( ), where z is the 
instrument variable and x is the independent variable. This condition can be statistically 
tested by regressing the instrument on the dependent variable. Significant coefficients of the 
regression output implies that the instrument is relevant for explaining the independent 
variable.  
The exclusion criterion is given when the instrument variable is uncorrelated with the error 
term u. This condition cannot be tested statistically, but must be assured through economic 
reasoning. Given the many sources of endogeneity, the main challenge of finding a good 
instrument lays in finding an instrument that fulfills this criterion, i.e. is strictly exogenous.  
Mathematically, the restriction can be expressed as ( , where z is the 
instrument and u is the error term. This restriction contains two further characteristics: the 
first states that the instrument can have no partial effect on the dependent variable beyond 
the effect of the endogenous variable it replaces and the variables included in the model. The 
second characteristic contained in the restriction is that the instrument must be uncorrelated 
with other possibly omitted variables (Wooldridge 2009:492).  
With regard to the first restriction, we expect a positive correlation between the instrument, 
energy resource endowments in 1980 and the more recent measure of energy resource 
endowments in 2004.  
In the case of energy resources, sources of time variation are new discoveries and depletion. 
As apparent from figure 4.1 the known level of oil reserves in Africa have increased 
substantially in the past 30 years. Conversely, there may also be countries with large 
discoveries in 1980 that were nearly depleted in 2004. Weak correlation between 
endowments of 1980 and 2004 would threaten the validity of our instrument. Although there 
has been a rapid development over the whole world and an intense exploitation of energy 
resources the recent years, it is this plausible that the correlation will be strong. As new oil 
and gas fields are often found close to existing fields, i.e., with new technology and drilling 
mechanisms, the fields may be larger than they appear in 1980.  In that sense, new 
discoveries may counter balance depletion. The restriction of correlation between the 
instrument and the endogenous variable can be tested, which we will do in the next section.  
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The second restriction entails that we must be sure that there is no possibility that variables 
that have influence on our dependent variable, FEE in our estimation period, also affect our 
instrument variable, observed energy resources in 1980. It is fairly reasonable that by using a 
predetermined level of energy resources, the effect of this on today’s level of FEE will be 
mainly through its correlation with a more recent measure of the same variable. 
However, the use of a predetermined endogenous variable as instrument is often criticized. 
One danger by using a predetermined value is the possibility that the lagged value of the 
variable, i.e. past endowments of energy resources, which in the past caused China to engage 
with that country and continue to do so because of the historic relationship with that country 
rather than because of the resource endowments today, which might be smaller than it was in 
the past. In this case, the restriction that there cannot be any partial effect on the dependent 
variable beyond the effect of the variable it replaces may not be fulfilled. However, up until 
the 1990s, China was a net exporter of oil and gas (IDE-JETRO 2009), making it less likely 
that the country engaged in large-scale investment activities in resource sectors abroad. We 
therefore do not regard this to not be an issue. If we had used a more recent measure, i.e. 
after the Chinese government started promoting foreign economic engagement, this effect 
would have been a larger concern.  
One can, however, argue that energy resources in 1980 may have influence on FEEs today, 
e.g. through the influence energy resource endowments may have on culture, institutions, 
economic activity etc. in 1980, which causes a certain country to be more attractive as host 
for FEEs today. 
Another main critic is that using lagged endogenous variables as instrument is problematic if 
the equation error or the omitted variables are serially correlated (Angrist and Krueger 
2001). We attempt to circumvent this by using a more distant lag of 25 years in order to 
reduce correlation between the instrument and the disturbances in the error term of the 
original ordinary least squares regression caused by omitted variable (Murray 2006). A 
drawback with using a more distant lag is normally the threat of weaker correlation between 
the instrument and instrumented variable, threatening the fulfillment of the first restriction. 
As we see, endogeneity caused by omitted variables might not be solved by using the IV 
approach.   
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In the case of measurement error, the use of IV-approach will provide consistent estimates if 
the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement error and equation error (that is the 
equation error from the model with correctly measured data), but correlated with the 
correctly measured variable (Angrist and Krueger 2001). We cannot be sure that the 
instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement error, as similar measurement errors are 
likely to be present in 1980 as in 2004. However, estimates of reserves in 1980 are likely to 
be subject to adjustments over time and are therefore likely to be more accurate than 
estimations from 2004.  
A last issue with IV estimation is the so-called LATE-effect. As there were several countries 
that did not have energy resources endowments in 1980, the use of instrumental variable 
implies that the IV-approach estimate the causal effect of energy resources for countries that 
did have energy resources in 1980, and not for those that did not23. We would, however, 
ideally be interested in the effect of energy resources also for countries, which did not have 
energy resources in 1980, but we miss this information when we apply IV-estimation. 
Consequently, the parameters identified by instrumental variables may differ from the 
average effect of interest (Angrist and Krueger 2001) 
 
                                                 
23 The term originates from medical experiments where a group of patients received treatment and the other group did not 
and refers to how the entities, in our case countries, response, in our case, to which extent they receive FEE, from the 
treatment, in our case having energy resources in 1980. 
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5 Results 
5.1  Preliminary discussions  
To be able to give evidence about the robustness of our results, we run our regressions on 
different specifications of our model. We run our regression once with as few control 
variables as possible and extend it by adding more control variables. By showing that our 
results remain similar through different specifications of the model, this will give us 
confidence that the endogeneity bias in our control variables is not a major issue and reduce 
the probability that we draw conclusions based on spurious results. Running our regressions 
on different model specifications will also reveal under which circumstances our results hold 
and give insights about the drivers of our results.  
The different model specifications are illustrated in the figure 5.1 below. We first fit the 
dataset to a model that only includes the variable energy resources and the SSA dummy in 
addition to the two exogenous control variables, distance and landlocked. In a second step, 
we include the interaction variable SSA*energy resources, or its instrument. This allows us 
to infer about the heterogeneity of the effect on energy resources in SSA countries compared 
to non-SSA countries. Thirdly, we add our remaining control variables in a third 
specification24.  
 
Figure 5.1 Model specifications  
 
 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑖  
+𝛽16𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑖  
+𝛽17𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽18𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽20𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝑢 
 
                                                 
24 In order to check for isolated significance we run the regression one time for each control variable, and one 
time where we include all control variables in the same regression. These results can be found in the Appendix. 
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The use of IV-estimation must be balanced against an inevitable loss of efficiency compared 
to the OLS-estimator (Frankel and Romer 1999). IV estimation will be consistent either way, 
but less efficient than OLS in absence of endogeneity. Performing a Wu-Hausman test of 
differences strongly suggest that the estimates are too similar to believe that an endogeneity 
bias is present25.  
Since there are potential problems associated with both estimation methods, we consequently 
run all three model specifications with both OLS and IV. This allows us to compare the 
results and infer about the size and direction of a possible bias. 
We have chosen to answer our hypotheses using two different approaches. In the first 
approach, we aggregate the values of all transactions for each country over the estimation 
period and use this as our dependent variable26. By doing this, we are able to analyze the 
effect of energy resources on total FEE volume on a country level. We only include 
countries that received FEE in the estimation period. Hence, the estimated coefficients 
measure the effect of energy resources given that a country already receives FEE from 
China. Correspondingly, we will not be able to infer anything about the decisions by Chinese 
companies’ regarding which foreign markets to enter.  
The second approach lets us investigate whether energy abundance also attract FEE of 
higher average value per project. For this estimation, we use the lowest level of aggregation 
in our dataset, corresponding to 1234 observations27. Each observation is a Chinese foreign 
project. As the number of projects vary across countries, this estimation captures the effect 
of both mean value of project and the relative number of projects in a certain country. In this 
approach, we control for time variation by using year dummies. 
                                                 
25 The p-value of Wu-Hausman test was 0.9, strongly indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
there are not systematic differences between the OLS and IV estimates. 
26 For this, we use the collapse command in STATA. 
27 We also run regression of project size on a country level by using project mean per country as dependent variable. By 
doing this, we weigh each country equally instead of each project, regardless of the number of projects the country may 
receive. This method will, however, overestimate the importance of countries that only receive a few large projects relative 
to countries that receive several smaller ones and is included only as a supplement. 
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Figure 5.2: Relationship between instrument and endogenous variable 
 
Source: British Petroleum (2005). 
 
The scatterplot in figure 5.2 serves as illustration of the correlation of our instrument with 
the endogenous variable. It shows that there is a clear positive correlation between energy 
resources in 1980 and energy resources in 2004, indicating that new discoveries have 
replaced depletion in most countries. The strong correlation also indicates that our 
instrument will be well suited to replace the endogenous variable.  
We perform two stages least squares regressions28. At the first stage regression, the 
endogenous variable is regressed by normal OLS on the instrument, energy resources in 
1980, and all exogenous variables in our model. In our case, this implies that energy 
resources in 2004 are estimated by our instrument, energy resource endowments in 1980, 
along with the dummy variables landlocked, distance to China and the SSA dummy 
(Wooldridge 2013). 29  
                                                 
28 Despite the name, 2SLS is done in one step in order to obtain the correct standard errors. Nevertheless, the 
intuition of a two-step estimation is very useful. 
29 Note that in the regressions including both the energy resource variable and the interaction between SSA and energy 
resources, this regression will be done twice. 
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We will show tables of the first stage regression results of the IV-regression of both energy 
resources alone and interacted with the SSA dummy for all regressions. The strong 
significance of the energy resources variable of 1980, indicated by strong coefficient 
significance and high F-value for all our first stage regressions, reveals that the relevance 
criterion is fulfilled. Also, the values for R-squared are high for all first stage estimations30. 
Consequently, the so-called finite sample bias of instrumental variables, which would cause 
the OLS estimator to be biased towards the OLS-estimate, is not likely to be a problem in 
any of our IV-estimations (Frankel and Romer 1999).  
As we will see, the coefficients tend to be higher for the IV-estimates compared to those 
estimated by OLS in the results shown above. This may imply that the part of energy 
resources of 2004 that is correlated with energy resources in 1980 is stronger in its influence 
of today’s FEE (Frankel and Romer 1999). This touches into the discussion on whether there 
are other factors that are determined by having energy resource for a long time, such as 
through its influence on the general economic situation, culture and institutions  (i.e. 
potential omitted variables) may be reflected through the IV-estimation.  
 
5.2  Hypothesis 1: The effect of energy resources on FEE 
Our first hypothesis states that Chinese FEE is attracted to energy resources and that this 
effect is stronger for SSA countries.  
 
 Total value of FEE 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the regression results when using the aggregated project volume per 
country over the whole period as our dependent variable. These estimations will tell us 
whether countries with energy resources attract higher amounts of FEE. 
 
                                                 
30 Only for our robustness checks we conduct IV regressions where the instrument is weak.  
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Table 5.1: Full sample country level data: First step IV 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lnenergy lnenergy ssaenergy lnenergy ssaenergy 
Energy resources 
1980 
1.019*** 1.011*** -0.007* 0.900*** -0.058** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.004) (0.060) (0.027) 
Energy resources 
1980 * SSA 
 0.157 1.168*** 0.334** 1.218*** 
  (0.160) (0.148) (0.168) (0.158) 
Observations 121.000 121.000 121.000 121.000 121.000 
R-sq 0.779 0.779 0.653 0.816 0.699 
F instr 440.29 237.54 41.15 138.31 30.62 
First step estimations for lnenergy and ssaenergy variables in full sample estimations using aggregated FEE 
transactions as the dependent variable. Control variables: SSA, Landlocked, Distance, GDP, Inflation and 
Polity. Robust standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 5.2: Full sample (county level) 
 OLS estimations IV estimations 2nd step 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
Energy resources 0.405*** 0.385*** 0.218*** 0.458*** 0.449*** 0.215** 
 (0.072) (0.077) (0.082) (0.080) (0.083) (0.096) 
SSA 0.175 0.065 0.725** 0.229 0.164 0.701** 
 (0.316) (0.350) (0.323) (0.312) (0.332) (0.310) 
Distance -0.302 -0.297 -0.264 -0.304 -0.301 -0.263 
 (0.220) (0.220) (0.243) (0.217) (0.217) (0.232) 
Landlocked -0.229 -0.204 0.105 -0.194 -0.176 0.109 
 (0.328) (0.333) (0.342) (0.322) (0.323) (0.327) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.269* 0.156  0.171* 0.210* 
  (0.139) (0.139)  (0.099) (0.123) 
GDP   0.401***   0.400*** 
   (0.070)   (0.070) 
Inflation   0.028**   0.028** 
   (0.012)   (0.013) 
Polity   -0.017   -0.017 
   (0.021)   (0.020) 
Constant 10.400*** 10.376*** 0.092 10.336*** 10.314*** 0.122 
 (1.925) (1.930) (2.930) (1.912) (1.909) (2.830) 
R2 0.212 0.217 0.381 0.209 0.213 0.381 
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Estimations are done using country level aggregated FEE transactions as dependent variable. The variables 
FEE, Energy resources, Distance and GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in percentages. Institutions 
measured in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are binary variables.  Robust standard errors. Standard 
errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 42 
 
As apparent from the table, the coefficient of the energy resource variable is positively 
significant at maximum 5 % significance level across all model specifications and for both 
estimation methods. The coefficients indicate that a 1 % increase in the energy resource 
reserves of a country will increase the value of FEE by 0.215% - 0.458%. The estimated 
effect of energy resources is largest in model specification 1. Inclusion of more control 
variables in specification 2 and 3 causes the estimated effect of energy resources to fall, 
indicating that some of the effects of other variables were captured in the coefficient of 
energy resources in specification 1.  
The estimated effect of being an energy abundant SSA country lies within the range of 
0.16% to 0.27%. The estimations are significant on a 10 % level for both OLS and IV 
estimations of specification 2 and for IV estimation of specification 3. 
Among the control variables, GDP seems to have an especially large attraction on Chinese 
FEE, as it is significant at a 1% level. This effect is in accordance with our findings from the 
descriptive analysis, that most of the FEE in our dataset go to large industrialized countries, 
with the US, Australia and Canada as top three host countries. It may reflect a market or 
technology seeking motive by Chinese companies. The coefficient when using both OLS and 
IV estimation indicate that a 1 % increase in the GDP of the host country will increase the 
total FEE by approximately 0.4 %.  
Inflation seems to have a significantly positive impact on Chinese FEE as well. Both 
estimation methods indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the inflation rates of a host 
country will increase the total FEE inflows by 2.8 %. When controlling for GDP and 
inflation, being an SSA country seems to have a large impact on the amount of FEE 
received.  
So far we have used both contracts and investments combined as our dependent variable. In 
order to check whether the effect of energy resources is different between the two groups we 
run the same regressions for the groups separately. By doing this, we find that energy 
resources is significant at attracting Chinese FEE for both contracts and investments. 
However, the effect of energy resources is only stronger for SSA countries in the case of 
contracts. This indicates that resource rich SSA countries will attract more contracts than 
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non-SSA countries, but they will not attract more investments. The results from this 
estimation can be found in the Appendix A6.  
 
Average project value 
To investigate whether energy abundance also attracts FEE of higher average value per 
project, we run regressions with project level FEE as our dependent variable. We now have 
1234 observations, where each observation is a Chinese foreign transaction.  
Table 5.3 shows the results from the first stage of the IV regression. Table 5.4 shows the 
estimation results when using project level FEE as our dependent variable.  
 
Table 5.3: Full sample (project level): First step IV 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
 (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) 
 lnenergy lnenergy ssaenergy lnenergy ssaenergy 
Energy resources 
1980 
0.907*** 0.890*** -0.007 0.811*** -0.063** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.004) (0.064) (0.025) 
Energy resources 
1980 * SSA 
 0.273*** 1.185*** 0.435*** 1.263*** 
  (0.078) (0.055) (0.082) (0.064) 
Observations 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 
R-sq 0.850 0.854 0.841 0.879 0.877 
F instr 221.48 282.08 267.26 190.08 201.42 
All estimations have been done using i.year, Landlocked and lnDistance. Specification 3 with additional 
controls: GDP, Inflation & Polity. Standard errors clustered on country level. Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
¨ 
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Table 5.4: Full sample (project level) 
 OLS estimations IV estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
Energy resources 0.037 0.026 0.012 0.031 0.019 0.002 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) 
SSA -0.114 -0.236* -0.250* -0.124 -0.293** -0.322** 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.143) (0.120) (0.125) (0.148) 
Distance 0.102 0.110 0.099 0.105 0.115 0.116 
 (0.076) (0.075) (0.084) (0.074) (0.074) (0.080) 
Landlocked 0.089 0.127 0.132 0.082 0.142 0.149 
 (0.123) (0.125) (0.128) (0.124) (0.126) (0.130) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.116** 0.135**  0.168*** 0.194*** 
  (0.046) (0.054)  (0.037) (0.042) 
GDP   0.016   0.016 
   (0.028)   (0.027) 
Inflation   0.005   0.006 
   (0.005)   (0.006) 
Institutions   -0.002   -0.002 
   (0.006)   (0.006) 
Constant 5.036*** 4.988**
* 
4.781*** 5.024*** 4.965*** 4.529*** 
 (0.798) (0.783) (0.864) (0.778) (0.763) (0.956) 
R2 0.019 0.022 0.014 0.018 0.021 0.022 
Observations 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 
Estimations are done using disaggregated FEE transactions as the dependent variable. The variables FEE, 
Energy resources, Distance and GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in percentages. Institutions measured 
in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are binary variables. All estimations include i.year as a control 
variable. Standard errors clustered on country level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
In the first step regressions all F-values are high, indicating that the instrument is strong.  
The coefficient of energy resources is positive but not significant in this estimation, 
indicating that the size of the transactions received by a host country is not dependent on its 
energy resource reserves. None of the coefficients of the control variables are significant.   
The interaction between energy resources and SSA is significant and positive for both 
estimation methods and for both specifications 1 and 2. The coefficients predict that a 1 % 
increase in energy resources will increase the value per FEE transaction by 0.12-0.19 % for 
SSA countries. This indicates that having energy resources will attract larger transactions to 
the SSA region compared to the non-SSA region.  
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As an additional analysis of the value of transactions, we have also run the model using the 
mean value of FEE on a country level as our dependent variable. The results from this 
estimation are available in Appendix A4. Similar to the last regression, using the aggregated 
mean value of FEE as the dependent variable reveals whether energy resources attracts 
transactions of average higher value. However, unlike the estimation results we have just 
shown, this approach does not take into account the number of projects received by each 
country. A main difference is that the effect of the interaction term is now clearer. This 
indicates that resource abundant SSA countries receive more small transactions than 
resource abundant non-SSA countries. Also, the coefficient of energy resources is 
significant. 
5.3  Hypothesis 2: The infrastructure hypothesis 
In our second hypothesis, we wish to examine whether resource abundant SSA countries 
attract FEE into the infrastructure sector. There are 98 countries with 432 transactions related 
to the infrastructure sector. The explanatory variables remain unchanged.   
 
 Total value of FEE 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 shows the regression results when using infrastructure FEE aggregated by 
country as our dependent variable. 
 
Table 5.5: Infrastructure sector: First step IV 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lnenergy lnenergy ssaenergy lnenergy ssaenergy 
Energy resources 
1980 
1.017*** 1.009*** -0.007 0.913*** -0.062** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.004) (0.065) (0.028) 
Energy resources 
1980 * SSA 
 0.144 1.160*** 0.304* 1.218*** 
  (0.155) (0.146) (0.164) (0.158) 
Observations 98.000 98.000 98.000 98.000 98.000 
R-sq 0.815 0.816 0.659 0.841 0.706 
F instr 391.63 212.26 39.62 121.58 30.77 
First step estimations for lnenergy and ssaenergy variables in infrastructure sector estimations using aggregated 
FEE transactions as the dependent variable. Estimations include the following control variables: Distance, 
Landlocked, GDP, Inflation, Institutions and SSA. Robust standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5.6: Infrastructure sector (country level) 
 OLS estimations IV estimations 2nd step 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
Energy resources 0.296*** 0.260*** 0.121 0.328*** 0.306*** 0.155* 
 (0.072) (0.074) (0.083) (0.076) (0.077) (0.085) 
SSA 0.636** 0.432 0.617* 0.678** 0.503* 0.604* 
 (0.295) (0.313) (0.347) (0.291) (0.300) (0.331) 
Energy resources 
* SSA 
 0.423*** 0.389**  0.398*** 0.488*** 
  (0.122) (0.159)  (0.095) (0.112) 
Constant 12.266*** 12.189*** 5.950** 12.315*** 12.262*** 6.586** 
 (1.886) (1.886) (2.929) (1.848) (1.837) (2.724) 
R-sq 0.205 0.229 0.304 0.204 0.226 0.301 
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 
Estimations are done using aggregated FEE transactions to the infrastructure sector as the dependent variable. 
The variables FEE, Energy resources, Distance and GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in percentages. 
Institutions measured in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are binary variables.  All estimations include 
i.year, Distance, Landlocked, GDP, Polity and Inflation as a control variables. Robust standard errors. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The coefficients of the energy resource variable predict that a 1 % increase in energy 
resource reserves will increase the total FEE by 0.121%-0.328%. With IV estimation, the 
coefficient is significant across all model specifications. When conducting OLS estimation, 
the coefficients are significant only when the controls are excluded. Comparing coefficients 
from OLS and IV pairwise by specification shows that their estimated values are very 
similar31.  
The interaction term is significantly positive, indicating that a 1 % increase in the energy 
resource reserves of SSA countries will lead to a 0.389-0.488% increase in FEE to the 
infrastructure sector. Hence, energy resources are attractive for FEE into the infrastructure 
sector in general but the effect is stronger for SSA countries. 
The coefficient of the SSA dummy is also significantly positive, indicating that SSA 
countries in general will receive more FEE to the infrastructure sector.  
 
                                                 
31 Control variables have been left out of the table, but the full estimation results are available in the Appendix 
A7.  
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 Average project value 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the first step and results from estimations using the disaggregated 
FEE value to the infrastructure sector as our dependent variable32. All F-values are high, 
indicating that we have a strong instrument here as well. 
 
 
Table 5.7: Infrastructure sector (project level): First step IV 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lnenergy lnenergy ssaenergy lnenergy ssaenergy 
Energy resources 
1980 
0.981*** 0.960*** -0.013* 0.859*** -0.079*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.007) (0.066) (0.027) 
Energy resources 
1980 * SSA 
 0.183** 1.159*** 0.369*** 1.253*** 
  (0.076) (0.059) (0.084) (0.070) 
Observations 432.000 432.000 432.000 432.000 432.000 
R-sq 0.881 0.883 0.853 0.910 0.890 
F instr 370.37 326.09 203.89 198.77 162.18 
Estimations are done using disaggregated FEE transactions to the infrastructure sector as the dependent 
variable. The variables FEE, Energy resources, Distance and GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in 
percentages. Institutions measured in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are binary variables.  All 
estimations include i.year as a control variable. Standard errors clustered on country. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
                                                 
32 Control variables have been left out of the table, but the full estimation results are available in Appendix A9.  
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Table 5.8: Infrastructure sector (project level) 
 OLS estimations IV estimations 2nd step 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 
Energy resources 0.069** 0.051* 0.049 0.077** 0.058* 0.074* 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.040) 
SSA 0.316** 0.182 0.124 0.330** 0.149 0.057 
 (0.147) (0.147) (0.172) (0.141) (0.149) (0.181) 
Energy resources 
* SSA 
 0.111** 0.124*  0.157*** 0.188*** 
  (0.051) (0.074)  (0.045) (0.053) 
Constant 6.066*** 6.037*** 6.638*** 6.088*** 6.061*** 7.226*** 
 (1.182) (1.178) (1.310) (1.155) (1.149) (1.289) 
R2 0.037 0.043 0.059 0.037 0.042 0.054 
Observations 432 432 432 432 432 432 
Standard errors in parentheses 
All estimations have been done using i.year. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The coefficients of the energy resource variable are significant across all specifications and 
for both estimation methods, except for specification 3 in the OLS estimation. The 
coefficients predict that a 1 % increase in energy resource reserves will increase the average 
value of FEE transactions by 0.05-0.08 %.  
The effect of energy resources is stronger for SSA countries, indicated by a positive and 
significant interaction term. The coefficient of the interaction term predicts that a 1 % 
increase in energy resource reserves will increase the value of FEE transactions by an 
additional 0.11-0.19 % for the SSA region.    
Using the mean value of FEE aggregated on a country level as our dependent variable we 
find similar results as in the disaggregated analysis. Hence, the number of projects does not 
seem to affect the results. The results from this analysis are available in Appendix A8. 
5.4 Further robustness checks  
We conducted a Breusch-Pagan test to check whether the errors are heteroscedastic. The 
results are displayed in the table A2.2.1 in the appendix, which suggests that heteroscedastic 
standard errors are present. We therefore conducted our analysis using robust standard errors 
for the country level analysis and clustering standard errors on a country level when 
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conducting the average project value analysis. This let us obtain consistent estimates also in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge 2013).  
We also ran tests for the variance inflation factors (VIF) in order to examine 
multicollinearity among our variables. As a rule of thumb, this value should be below 10, 
which applies for all our variables. The highest collinearity existing between two variables is 
0.6 between GDP and FEE, which is below a common rule of thumb to drop variables with 
collinearity above 0.7. Generally, interaction variables are often correlated with the variables 
it is comprised of. However, as displayed in the table, this is not an issue in our case.33  
In order to further check robustness of our results, we also tried excluding Nigeria from the 
dataset. As shown in the scatterplot, the results for SSA seem to be driven by a few countries 
with considerable energy resource reserves, of which Nigeria is the country with the largest 
reserves. The results from this estimation are available in Appendix A10. Energy resources 
still attract larger amounts of FEE in the full sample, but the interaction term is negative and 
is no longer significant. The IV estimate may also be biased, since the F-value of the first 
step of the IV regression is very low (3.25). To check the robustness of results for the 
infrastructure hypothesis as well, we tried running the regression on infrastructure FEE 
without Nigeria. It appears that Nigeria has a large impact on both the effect of energy 
resources and the interaction term, as none of these are significant when Nigeria is excluded.  
Hence, Nigeria seems to be an important driver for our results in SSA. The importance of 
just one country can be attributed to the fact that the resource variable employed, assign 
zeroes to all countries that do not have proven gas reserves over 0.09 trillion cubic meters 
and oil reserves over 0.47 billion barrels. Consequently, only 55 out of 121 countries have a 
value for its resource endowments assigned in the dataset. In SSA, only 6 out of 34 countries 
have a value assigned. Therefore, for several countries that might have smaller resource 
endowments, this is not registered. We would like to have known the resource endowments 
also for SSA countries with smaller reserves to get more robust estimates.  
                                                 
33 The correlation between the interaction term and SSA is 0.2 and Energy is 0.07. For correlation matrix, see Appendix 
A2.1. 
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Figure 5.3 The relationship between FEE and Energy resources. Vertical axis shows ln 
FEE, horizontal axis shows ln energy resources, blue dots are SSA and red dots are non-
SSA. 
 
Source: Heritage Foundation (2014), British Petroleum (2005)    
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6 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate the determinants of the Chinese foreign 
economic engagement (FEE) with a particular focus on Sub Saharan Africa. According to 
prevalent literature, FDI is typically driven by three main motivations: market-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking and resource-seeking. In the case of China in SSA, both market seeking 
and efficiency seeking motives may play a role, yet the focus in this thesis is on the 
importance of energy resources for Chinese foreign economic engagement.   
Our scope has been twofold: Firstly, we hypothesized that energy resources attract Chinese 
FEE and that the attraction to energy resources in SSA countries is stronger than in non-SSA 
countries. Secondly, we hypothesized that energy resource abundance attract Chinese FEE to 
the infrastructure sector. Our motivations for our hypotheses were the observations that 
China seemed to have a large engagement in energy extractive industries and infrastructure 
in SSA countries. Based on findings from our data analysis combined with notions from 
prevalent literature, we will in the following suggest some interpretations for our findings. 
1st hypothesis: Chinese FEE’s attraction to energy resources 
The results with regard to our first hypothesis indicated that having energy resources will 
attract more Chinese FEE. They also indicated that the effect is stronger for SSA countries. 
Hence, SSA countries receive more FEE relative to their resource endowments than non-
SSA countries. This was the case for both contracts and investment, yet, the effect for 
contract activities was stronger in SSA. Furthermore, our results showed that having energy 
resources attract significantly larger average transaction value per project, yet that this effect 
is only significant for SSA countries.  
That Chinese companies are attracted to energy resources is in line with our expectations that 
the country wish to secure energy supply in order to be able to meet its growing demand.   
China has experienced impressive economic growth during the past decades, which has 
created a domestic demand for energy resources in China. In order to be able to secure 
energy supplies for the future, the Chinese government has encouraged Chinese companies 
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to engage in resource-seeking activities abroad through SOEs and financial incentives for 
privately owned companies.  
That China is more attracted to energy resources in SSA countries than elsewhere may be 
rooted in a combination of several factors. Since SSA countries are among the least 
developed in the world they may be more easily accessible for countries willing to offer aid 
and cheap financing in return for access to natural resources, a method commonly used by 
the Chinese government when facilitating business for Chinese companies abroad.  
Furthermore, a general attraction to the SSA region based on further attractive characteristics 
beyond their resource abundance, may contribute to increase the attraction to energy 
resources in this region. As touched upon in part 2, China may see an attractive long term 
business potential in Africa with regard to efficiency seeking and market seeking motives. 
Hence, characteristics of the SSA region that may appear attractive for other Chinese 
business segments induces the Chinese government to encourage Chinese companies, 
including energy companies, to engage in this region,  to a larger extent than elsewhere.  
Adding to this, many Western companies are subject to various constraints such as 
international agreements and standards that are deterring for business relations with SSA 
countries. In contrast, Chinese companies operate relatively unconstrained in SSA, which 
give Chinese companies special incentives to engage economically with the SSA region 
compared to more regulated environments (Kaplinski and Morris 2009).  
As extraction of energy resources tends to be capital intensive, it is peculiar that the effect of 
energy resources on average project value only appears in SSA. One possible explanation is 
the possibility that there are more investment options and contracting projects in non-SSA 
countries, where Chinese companies choose to direct large transactions per project that are 
not related to energy extractive industries. This is likely to be due to the fact that non-SSA 
economies are more sophisticated than SSA. Correspondingly, engagement in energy 
resources does not increase average project level in non-SSA energy abundant countries. The 
lack of investment options in SSA countries equally lucrative to Chinese companies than 
energy resources is likely to be a reason, why energy abundance causes average value of 
project FEE to increase in SSA countries.  
Another possible explanation for this finding is that Chinese companies more often partner 
up with local firms when conducting investments and contracts in non-SSA countries. Our 
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data material shows that 32 % of FEE transactions in SSA are performed with a partner and 
68 % with no partner. For non-SSA countries, 68 % of FEE transactions are performed with 
a partner and 32 % with no partner. This might be an indication that China partners up with 
local companies in countries that are more developed than China itself in order to gain 
access to advanced technology and knowledge.  
 
2nd hypothesis: The effect of having energy resources on infrastructure for SSA 
countries  
The analysis of energy resource’s attraction of FEE in infrastructure indicated that energy 
resources attract more Chinese FEE, both in terms of aggregated value of Chinese FEE on a 
country level and at the average sizes of transactions. The effect is present for energy 
resources in general, but stronger for SSA countries.  
As developed in the descriptive analysis, infrastructure projects in the SSA region are more 
often on a contract base, whereas they in the non-SSA region tend to be investments. This 
suggests that infrastructure projects in SSA countries to a larger extent are construction 
projects compared to in non-SSA countries. In part 2, we touched upon potential motivations 
for directing infrastructure FEE towards energy abundant countries. Firstly, it is possible that 
the motivation behind increased infrastructure FEE in relation to energy resources to 
strengthen their relationship with those in power. By offering generous financing schemes 
and often also aid, this may foster and improve diplomatic and business relationships in the 
SSA countries.  
Secondly, the general low development level in the SSA region might represent a significant 
impediment for resource extracting companies. Improvement of infrastructure sector may 
therefore be a prerequisite for obtaining reliable export routes for energy resources. 
Thirdly, an apparent link between infrastructure and energy resources may exist because 
Chinese companies prefer foreign locations where there is already a Chinese presence. This 
would create a link between energy resources and infrastructure development that is not 
motivated by energy resources directly.  
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An analysis on the extent to which FEE into the infrastructure sector actually were related to 
energy resource extractive projects would possibly have revealed insights on the motivations 
for Chinese infrastructure FEE into resource abundant countries. If FEE went mostly into 
infrastructure in relation to extractive industry locations, this would indicate that these 
transactions where facilitating energy resource export to China. Yet, as previously 
mentioned, the HF data does not reveal any information on this.  
Concluding, we can say that both our hypotheses were confirmed. China is attracted to 
energy resources and the attraction is stronger in SSA countries. Energy resources also 
attract Chinese economic engagement in the infrastructure sector in general, and this effect is 
stronger for SSA as well.   
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8 Appendix 
A1. Descriptive statistics 
 
A1.1 Geographical distribution of FDI in HF and UNCTAD data 
 
   
Geographical distribution of Chinese FDI in million dollars in the period 2005-2011 according to Heritage 
Foundation 2014 (left) and UNCTAD 2013 (right diagram)  
Source: Heritage Foundation (2014) and UNCTAD (2013).  
 
A1.2 Geographical distribution of FEE in HF data      
 
Source: Heritage Foundation (2014) 
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A1.3 Descriptive statistics for country level data  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Chinese FEE (mean value) 134 757.17 551.95 100 2800 
Chinese FEE (total value) 134 8256.42 14988.76 100 111810 
Energy resources 2004 134 17.54 56.23 0 389.01 
Energy resources 1980 134 9.75 39.63 0 372.33 
SSA 134 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Landlocked 134 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Distance 130 8755.41 3932.17 1123.94 19110.13 
GDP 131 3.02e+11 1.20e+12 1.11e+08 1.23e+13 
Inflation 130 8.23 7.24 -1.99 39.79 
Polity IV 130 3.14 6.80 -10 10 
 
 
A1.4 Descriptive statistics for project level data 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Chinese FEE 1275 867.73 1476.59 100 19500 
Energy resources 2004 1275 40.97 83.63 0 389.01 
Energy resources 1980 1275 28.10 66.47 0 372.33 
SSA 1275 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Landlocked 1275 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Distance 1259 8543.58 3910.41 1123.94 19110.13 
GDP 1258 1.46e+12 3.49e+12 1.11e+08 1.23e+13 
Inflation 1267 8.36 7.64 -1.99 39.79 
Polity IV 1270 3.76 6.72 -10 10 
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A.2 Robustness tests 
A2.1 Colinearity 
Table A2.1.1: Correlation matrix for main specification  
 FEE Energy SSA SSA*Energy Distance Landlocked Inflation Polity GDP 
FEE 1.00         
Energy 0.29 1.00        
SSA -0.14 -0.17 1.00       
SSA*Energy 0.13 0.07 0.20 1.00      
Distance 0.02 -0.13 0.31 0.07 1.00     
Landlocked -0.14 -0.14 0.10 -0.06 -0.15 1.00    
Inflation 0.01 0.30 0.15 -0.04 0.01 0.03 1.00   
Polity 0.09 -0.26 -0.13 -0.02 0.25 -0.11 -0.43 1.00  
GDP 0.61 0.07 -0.15 -0.15 -0.02 -0.12 -0.18 0.23 1.00 
 
 
Table A2.1.2 Test for multicolinearity 
 
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.1193
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Condition Number         7.1619 
---------------------------------
    10     0.0755          7.1619
    9     0.1730          4.7324
    8     0.2242          4.1565
    7     0.2423          3.9980
    6     0.5556          2.6404
    5     0.8165          2.1782
    4     1.0426          1.9275
    3     1.3680          1.6827
    2     1.6287          1.5422
    1     3.8736          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
  Mean VIF      1.64
----------------------------------------------------
       gdp      1.91    1.38    0.5240      0.4760
    polity      1.74    1.32    0.5732      0.4268
 inflation      1.61    1.27    0.6192      0.3808
Landlocked      1.04    1.02    0.9577      0.0423
Weighteddistance      1.29    1.13    0.7773      0.2227
ssaenergy2      1.77    1.33    0.5635      0.4365
       ssa      1.98    1.41    0.5049      0.4951
    energy      1.53    1.24    0.6549      0.3451
     quant      1.90    1.38    0.5269      0.4731
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
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A2.2 Heteroscedasticity 
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Heteroscedasticity test: Aggregated data (left) and disagregated data (right) 
 
Table A2.2.1: Results from Breusch-Pagan test: 
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.558562   4.926136    -0.52   0.605    -12.31907    7.201944
      polity     -.016472   .0353696    -0.47   0.642    -.0865525    .0536084
   inflation    -.0371779   .0297528    -1.25   0.214    -.0961292    .0217734
       lngdp     .0874342   .1261589     0.69   0.490    -.1625335     .337402
  Landlocked     .8561083   .4659369     1.84   0.069     -.067086    1.779303
      lndist     .2355517   .4012432     0.59   0.558    -.5594603    1.030564
         ssa     -.087817   .5554828    -0.16   0.875    -1.188435    1.012801
   ssaenergy    -.2532057   .4279774    -0.59   0.555    -1.101188    .5947766
    lnenergy    -.0772156   .1514063    -0.51   0.611    -.3772078    .2227765
                                                                              
       uhat2        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    477.832439   120  3.98193699           Root MSE      =   1.997
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0015
    Residual    446.650736   112    3.987953           R-squared     =  0.0653
       Model    31.1817023     8  3.89771279           Prob > F      =  0.4575
                                                       F(  8,   112) =    0.98
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     121
 
 
Table A2.2.2: Results from Breusch-Pagan/Cook Weisberg test 
    Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :   8.449  Chi-sq(8) P-value = 0.3909
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic
IV heteroskedasticity test(s) using levels of IVs only
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A2.3 Endogeneity 
Table A2.3.1: Results from Hausmann test: 
                Prob>chi2 =      1.0000
                          =        0.08
                  chi2(8) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivreg
                                                                              
         ssa      .7009073     .7249441       -.0240368        .0895239
       lngdp      .4000726     .4014677       -.0013951        .0247339
      polity     -.0169519    -.0170341        .0000822        .0057373
   inflation      .0282412     .0282577       -.0000165        .0046404
  Landlocked      .1086474     .1046438        .0040037        .0263811
      lndist     -.2629708    -.2639084        .0009375         .021667
   ssaenergy      .2096703     .1557484         .053922        .1869134
    lnenergy      .2147565     .2180641       -.0033076        .0630518
                                                                              
                     iv           .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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A2.4 The relationship between Energy resources 1980 and Energy resources 2004 
 
Table A2.4.1: Project level data (1234 obs) 
 
 
Table A2.4.2: Country level data (121 obs): Mean (left), total value (right)  
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A.3 Full sample analysis (country level data) 
A3.1: All sectors (country level): OLS estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.405*** 0.385*** 0.315*** 0.387*** 0.430*** 0.218*** 
 (0.072) (0.077) (0.067) (0.088) (0.083) (0.082) 
SSA 0.175 0.065 0.806** 0.071 0.212 0.725** 
 (0.316) (0.350) (0.318) (0.350) (0.366) (0.323) 
Distance -0.302 -0.297 -0.332 -0.298 -0.396* -0.264 
 (0.220) (0.220) (0.239) (0.219) (0.216) (0.243) 
Landlocked -0.229 -0.204 0.112 -0.202 -0.152 0.105 
 (0.328) (0.333) (0.345) (0.340) (0.345) (0.342) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.269* 0.155 0.268* 0.254* 0.156 
  (0.139) (0.131) (0.142) (0.145) (0.139) 
GDP   0.335***   0.401*** 
   (0.066)   (0.070) 
Inflation    -0.001  0.028** 
    (0.015)  (0.012) 
Polity     0.029 -0.017 
     (0.020) (0.021) 
Constant 10.400*** 10.376*** 2.384 10.388*** 11.081*** 0.092 
 (1.925) (1.930) (2.826) (1.904) (1.891) (2.930) 
R2 0.212 0.217 0.361 0.217 0.231 0.381 
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Estimations are done using country level aggregated FEE transactions as dependent variable. The variables FEE, Energy resources, 
Distance and GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in percentages. Institutions measured in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are 
binary variables.  Robust standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
A3.2: All sectors (country level): Second step IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.458*** 0.449*** 0.314*** 0.463*** 0.490*** 0.215** 
 (0.080) (0.083) (0.075) (0.098) (0.090) (0.096) 
SSA 0.229 0.164 0.833*** 0.207 0.341 0.701** 
 (0.312) (0.332) (0.300) (0.342) (0.358) (0.310) 
Distance -0.304 -0.301 -0.334 -0.305 -0.417** -0.263 
 (0.217) (0.217) (0.233) (0.215) (0.212) (0.232) 
Landlocked -0.194 -0.176 0.104 -0.169 -0.131 0.109 
 (0.322) (0.323) (0.333) (0.327) (0.333) (0.327) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.171* 0.086 0.144 0.100 0.210* 
  (0.099) (0.097) (0.131) (0.121) (0.123) 
GDP   0.337***   0.400*** 
   (0.065)   (0.070) 
Inflation    -0.007  0.028** 
    (0.016)  (0.013) 
Polity     0.033 -0.017 
     (0.020) (0.020) 
Constant 10.336*** 10.314*** 2.334 10.392*** 11.156*** 0.122 
 (1.912) (1.909) (2.747) (1.872) (1.858) (2.830) 
R2 0.209 0.213 0.361 0.212 0.227 0.381 
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Estimations are done using country level aggregated FEE transactions as dependent variable. The variables FEE, Energy resources, 
Distance and GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in percentages. Institutions measured in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are 
binary variables.  Robust standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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A3.3: All sectors (aggregated data): First step IV for Energy resources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy 
SSA -0.255 -0.273 -0.414* -0.439** -0.464** -0.486** 
 (0.168) (0.172) (0.212) (0.176) (0.179) (0.196) 
Distance 0.040 0.040 0.048 0.059 0.185 0.173 
 (0.143) (0.144) (0.143) (0.139) (0.139) (0.135) 
Landlocked 0.014 0.014 -0.045 -0.032 -0.054 -0.048 
 (0.194) (0.194) (0.184) (0.177) (0.167) (0.165) 
Energy resources 1980 1.019*** 1.011*** 1.039*** 0.942*** 0.958*** 0.900*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.046) (0.053) (0.049) (0.060) 
Energy resources 1980 
* SSA 
 0.157 0.181 0.301 0.254* 0.334** 
  (0.160) (0.165) (0.199) (0.137) (0.168) 
GDP   -0.069*   0.035 
   (0.038)   (0.044) 
Inflation    0.036***  0.027** 
    (0.010)  (0.010) 
Polity     -0.043*** -0.036** 
     (0.013) (0.014) 
Constant 0.106 0.113 1.756 -0.257 -0.953 -1.903 
 (1.260) (1.265) (1.603) (1.211) (1.190) (1.544) 
Observations 121.000 121.000 121.000 121.000 121.000 121.000 
R-sq 0.779 0.779 0.784 0.802 0.806 0.816 
F instr 440.29 237.54 272.85 188.64 239.71 138.31 
First step estimations for lnenergy variable in full sample estimations using aggregated FEE transactions as the dependent variable. Robust 
standard errors.Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
A3.4: All sectors (aggregated data): First step IV for SSA*Energy resources 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ssaenergy ssaenergy ssaenergy ssaenergy ssaenergy 
Distance  -0.017 -0.019 -0.012 0.010 0.014 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) 
Landlocked  -0.107** -0.097* -0.121** -0.120** -0.098* 
  (0.053) (0.050) (0.056) (0.058) (0.051) 
SSA  0.228** 0.253** 0.179* 0.193** 0.227** 
  (0.109) (0.121) (0.097) (0.092) (0.104) 
Energy resources 1980  -0.007* -0.011* -0.027 -0.016* -0.058** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.009) (0.027) 
Energy resources 1980 
* SSA 
 1.168*** 1.163*** 1.211*** 1.186*** 1.218*** 
  (0.148) (0.148) (0.167) (0.141) (0.158) 
GDP   0.012   0.045** 
   (0.008)   (0.021) 
Inflation    0.011  0.011 
    (0.008)  (0.008) 
Polity     -0.008** -0.009* 
     (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant  0.180 -0.105 0.070 -0.018 -1.220** 
  (0.191) (0.203) (0.206) (0.174) (0.588) 
Observations  121.000 121.000 121.000 121.000 121.000 
R-sq  0.653 0.655 0.678 0.664 0.699 
F instr  41.15 39.23 26.65 44.08 30.62 
First step estimations for ssaenergy variable in full sample estimations using aggregated FEE transactions as the dependent variable..Robust 
standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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A.4 Full sample analysis (country level mean) 
A4.1: All sectors (country level mean): OLS estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.109*** 0.099** 0.076* 0.095** 0.112** 0.033 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.048) 
SSA -0.128 -0.177 0.077 -0.188 -0.135 0.041 
 (0.171) (0.191) (0.182) (0.191) (0.203) (0.186) 
Distance 0.055 0.058 0.046 0.059 0.029 0.075 
 (0.123) (0.124) (0.125) (0.123) (0.129) (0.130) 
Landlocked 0.153 0.164 0.272 0.161 0.179 0.269 
 (0.195) (0.197) (0.206) (0.201) (0.205) (0.207) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.120 0.081 0.121 0.116 0.082 
  (0.075) (0.073) (0.076) (0.074) (0.088) 
GDP   0.115***   0.144*** 
   (0.035)   (0.036) 
Inflation    0.002  0.012* 
    (0.007)  (0.007) 
Polity     0.008 -0.007 
     (0.012) (0.013) 
Constant 5.751*** 5.740*** 3.001** 5.719*** 5.941*** 2.002 
 (1.069) (1.073) (1.402) (1.065) (1.099) (1.449) 
R2 0.072 0.077 0.149 0.077 0.082 0.165 
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Estimations are done using country level aggregated FEE transactions as dependent variable. The variables FEE, Energy resources, 
Distance and GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in percentages. Institutions measured in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are 
binary variables.  Robust standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
A4.2: All sectors (country level mean): Second step IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.114*** 0.108*** 0.061 0.105** 0.118*** 0.012 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.053) 
SSA -0.123 -0.172 0.060 -0.179 -0.126 -0.005 
 (0.169) (0.181) (0.174) (0.183) (0.195) (0.181) 
Distance 0.055 0.058 0.046 0.058 0.027 0.082 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.120) (0.125) (0.122) 
Landlocked 0.156 0.171 0.267 0.170 0.182 0.270 
 (0.189) (0.190) (0.199) (0.192) (0.195) (0.198) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.130** 0.100* 0.134** 0.111* 0.160** 
  (0.056) (0.059) (0.064) (0.064) (0.071) 
GDP   0.117***   0.148*** 
   (0.034)   (0.035) 
Inflation    0.001  0.014* 
    (0.008)  (0.007) 
Polity     0.009 -0.009 
     (0.011) (0.012) 
Constant 5.745*** 5.728*** 2.965** 5.716*** 5.948*** 1.863 
 (1.052) (1.052) (1.345) (1.038) (1.067) (1.350) 
R2 0.072 0.077 0.148 0.077 0.082 0.162 
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Estimations are done using country level aggregated FEE transactions as dependent variable. The variables FEE, Energy resources, 
Distance and GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in percentages. Institutions measured in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are 
binary variables.  Robust standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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A.5 Full sample analysis (project level data) 
A5.1: All sectors (project level data): OLS estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.037 0.026 0.026 0.019 0.024 0.012 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
SSA -0.114 -0.236* -0.236* -0.266** -0.247* -0.250* 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.139) (0.125) (0.126) (0.143) 
Distance 0.102 0.110 0.110 0.115 0.118 0.099 
 (0.076) (0.075) (0.079) (0.073) (0.081) (0.084) 
Landlocked 0.089 0.127 0.126 0.118 0.123 0.132 
 (0.123) (0.125) (0.128) (0.126) (0.125) (0.128) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.116** 0.116** 0.121** 0.117** 0.135** 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.054) (0.047) (0.054) 
GDP   -0.000   0.016 
   (0.025)   (0.028) 
Inflation    0.004  0.005 
    (0.005)  (0.005) 
Polity     -0.002 -0.002 
     (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 5.036*** 4.988*** 4.992*** 4.915*** 4.923*** 4.781*** 
 (0.798) (0.783) (0.939) (0.746) (0.787) (0.864) 
R2 0.019 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.014 
Observations 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 
Estimations are done using disaggregated FEE transactions as the dependent variable. The variables FEE, Energy resources, Distance and 
GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in percentages. Institutions measured in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are binary 
variables. All estimations include i.year as a control variable. Standard errors clustered on country-level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
A5.2: All sectors (project level data): Second step IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.031 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.018 0.002 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) 
SSA -0.124 -0.293** -0.293** -0.335** -0.307** -0.322** 
 (0.120) (0.125) (0.143) (0.135) (0.131) (0.148) 
Distance 0.105 0.115 0.115 0.120* 0.124 0.116 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.078) (0.072) (0.079) (0.080) 
Landlocked 0.082 0.142 0.142 0.139 0.139 0.149 
 (0.124) (0.126) (0.128) (0.127) (0.125) (0.130) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.186*** 0.171*** 0.194*** 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.042) 
GDP   -0.000   0.016 
   (0.024)   (0.027) 
Inflation    0.005  0.006 
    (0.005)  (0.006) 
Polity     -0.002 -0.002 
     (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 5.024*** 4.965*** 4.970*** 4.883*** 4.886*** 4.529*** 
 (0.778) (0.763) (0.901) (0.728) (0.766) (0.956) 
R2 0.018 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.022 
Observations 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 
Estimations are done using disaggregated FEE transactions as the dependent variable. The variables FEE, Energy resources, Distance and 
GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in percentages. Institutions measured in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are binary 
variables. All estimations include i.year as a control variable. Standard errors clustered on country-level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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A5.3: All sectors (disaggregated data): First step IV for Energy resources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 lnenerg lnenerg lnenerg lnenerg lnenerg lnenerg 
       
Energy resources 
1980 
0.907*** 0.890*** 0.933*** 0.849*** 0.868*** 0.811*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.052) (0.052) (0.064) 
       
Energy resources 
1980 * SSA 
 0.273*** 0.287*** 0.421*** 0.332*** 0.435*** 
  (0.078) (0.071) (0.090) (0.064) (0.082) 
       
Constant -0.345 -0.372 1.034 -0.937 -2.071 -3.158 
 (1.857) (1.819) (2.219) (1.590) (1.548) (2.097) 
Observations 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 
R-sq 0.850 0.854 0.859 0.871 0.871 0.879 
F instr 221.48 282.08 187.44 270.03 378.17 190.08 
First step estimations for lnenergy variable in full data set estimations using disaggregated FEE transactions as the 
dependent variable. Estimations include the following control variables: Distance, Landlocked, GDP, Inflation, Institutions, 
SSA and i.year. Standard errors clustered on country-level. Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
 
 
 
A5.4: All sectors (disaggregated data): First step IV for SSA*Energy resources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ssaenerg ssaenerg ssaenerg ssaenerg ssaenerg 
Energy resources 
1980 
 -0.007 -0.008 -0.023 -0.011 -0.063** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007) (0.025) 
       
Energy resources 
1980 * SSA 
 1.185*** 1.184*** 1.244*** 1.196*** 1.263*** 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.066) (0.050) (0.064) 
       
Constant  0.210 0.153 -0.015 -0.108 -1.444** 
  (0.186) (0.178) (0.283) (0.182) (0.604) 
Observations  1234 1234 1234 1234 1234 
R-sq  0.841 0.841 0.864 0.846 0.877 
F instr  267.26 259.24 199.68 309.22 201.42 
First step estimations for ssaenergy variable in full data set estimations using disaggregated FEE transactions as the 
dependent variable. Estimations include the following control variables: Distance, Landlocked, GDP, Inflation, Institutions, 
SSA and i.year. Standard errors clustered on country-level.  Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
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A.6 Contracts and investments 
 
Table A6.1: Full sample (country level): Contracts vs investments 
 Contracts Investments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Energy resources 0.154* 0.136 0.195* 0.233* 
 (0.092) (0.105) (0.113) (0.134) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
0.283** 0.414*** -0.109 0.120 
 (0.141) (0.125) (0.238) (0.177) 
SSA 0.647* 0.578* 0.358 0.268 
 (0.338) (0.330) (0.451) (0.460) 
Distance -0.817** -0.812** 0.151 0.137 
 (0.341) (0.321) (0.237) (0.220) 
Landlocked -0.117 -0.102 0.482 0.543 
 (0.306) (0.290) (0.472) (0.446) 
GDP 0.179** 0.180** 0.421*** 0.394*** 
 (0.082) (0.075) (0.071) (0.073) 
Inflation 0.030** 0.031** 0.002 -0.004 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) 
Polity -0.040* -0.040* 0.004 0.010 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.029) 
Constant 9.819** 9.768*** -4.635 -3.876 
 (3.830) (3.519) (2.880) (2.724) 
R2 0.331 0.329 0.368 0.362 
Observations 98 98 88 88 
F-value of excluded        
instruments 
 89.71 
31.39 
 451.66 
309.04 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 70 
A.7 Infrastructure sector analysis (country level) 
A7.1: Infrastructure sector (country level): OLS estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.296*** 0.260*** 0.227*** 0.220*** 0.263*** 0.121 
 (0.072) (0.074) (0.072) (0.080) (0.081) (0.083) 
SSA 0.636** 0.432 0.727** 0.331 0.442 0.617* 
 (0.295) (0.313) (0.335) (0.321) (0.338) (0.347) 
Distance -0.610*** -0.596*** -0.576** -0.600*** -0.602*** -0.505** 
 (0.218) (0.218) (0.231) (0.216) (0.212) (0.238) 
Landlocked -0.408 -0.356 -0.243 -0.378 -0.354 -0.244 
 (0.296) (0.299) (0.313) (0.300) (0.303) (0.309) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.423*** 0.382*** 0.434*** 0.422*** 0.389** 
  (0.122) (0.121) (0.134) (0.125) (0.159) 
GDP   0.144**   0.217*** 
   (0.063)   (0.069) 
Inflation    0.020  0.031** 
    (0.015)  (0.014) 
Polity     0.002 -0.018 
     (0.020) (0.022) 
Constant 12.266*** 12.189*** 8.439*** 12.132*** 12.233*** 5.950** 
 (1.886) (1.886) (2.710) (1.855) (1.828) (2.929) 
R2 0.205 0.229 0.267 0.242 0.229 0.304 
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
A7.2: Infrastructure sector (country level): Second step IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.328*** 0.306*** 0.250*** 0.277*** 0.313*** 0.155* 
 (0.076) (0.077) (0.073) (0.087) (0.084) (0.085) 
SSA 0.678** 0.503* 0.756** 0.409 0.539 0.604* 
 (0.291) (0.300) (0.319) (0.314) (0.331) (0.331) 
Distance -0.622*** -0.613*** -0.585*** -0.616*** -0.635*** -0.529** 
 (0.213) (0.212) (0.222) (0.210) (0.208) (0.223) 
Landlocked -0.384 -0.326 -0.232 -0.332 -0.321 -0.218 
 (0.291) (0.292) (0.302) (0.291) (0.295) (0.296) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.398*** 0.364*** 0.455*** 0.384*** 0.488*** 
  (0.095) (0.094) (0.114) (0.110) (0.112) 
GDP   0.140**   0.198*** 
   (0.060)   (0.064) 
Inflation    0.016  0.029** 
    (0.015)  (0.014) 
Polity     0.006 -0.014 
     (0.020) (0.021) 
Constant 12.315*** 12.262*** 8.587*** 12.218*** 12.420*** 6.586** 
 (1.848) (1.837) (2.605) (1.805) (1.787) (2.724) 
R2 0.204 0.226 0.266 0.237 0.226 0.301 
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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A7.3: Infrastructure sector (country level): First step IV for Energy resources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy 
SSA -0.245 -0.266 -0.379 -0.412* -0.456** -0.475** 
 (0.205) (0.210) (0.244) (0.209) (0.220) (0.231) 
Distance 0.134 0.135 0.126 0.119 0.263 0.234 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.175) (0.171) (0.175) (0.174) 
Landlocked -0.121 -0.120 -0.165 -0.142 -0.159 -0.146 
 (0.194) (0.196) (0.189) (0.192) (0.180) (0.182) 
Energy resources 1980 1.017*** 1.009*** 1.034*** 0.948*** 0.962*** 0.913*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.050) (0.056) (0.054) (0.065) 
Energy resources 1980 
* SSA 
 0.144 0.165 0.273 0.234* 0.304* 
  (0.155) (0.159) (0.191) (0.138) (0.168) 
GDP   -0.061   0.030 
   (0.042)   (0.049) 
Inflation    0.032***  0.024** 
    (0.009)  (0.011) 
Polity     -0.037*** -0.031* 
     (0.014) (0.017) 
Constant -0.709 -0.711 0.875 -0.749 -1.651 -2.306 
 (1.491) (1.496) (1.897) (1.454) (1.473) (1.929) 
Observations 98.000 98.000 98.000 98.000 98.000 98.000 
R-sq 0.815 0.816 0.820 0.833 0.833 0.841 
F instr 391.63 212.26 236.36 173.36 208.45 121.58 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
A7.4: Infrastructure sector (country level): First step IV for SSA*Energy 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy 
Distance  -0.005 -0.004 -0.011 0.026 0.032 
  (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033) 
Landlocked  -0.140** -0.132* -0.149** -0.150** -0.124* 
  (0.070) (0.067) (0.070) (0.072) (0.066) 
SSA  0.254** 0.276** 0.200* 0.208** 0.235** 
  (0.121) (0.131) (0.109) (0.100) (0.111) 
Energy resources 1980  -0.007 -0.011* -0.029 -0.018* -0.062** 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.018) (0.010) (0.028) 
Energy resources 1980 
* SSA 
 1.160*** 1.156*** 1.209*** 1.183*** 1.218*** 
  (0.146) (0.146) (0.168) (0.138) (0.158) 
GDP   0.012   0.048** 
   (0.009)   (0.023) 
Inflation    0.012  0.012 
    (0.008)  (0.009) 
Polity     -0.009** -0.011 
     (0.005) (0.007) 
Constant  0.078 -0.228 0.063 -0.153 -1.461** 
  (0.219) (0.278) (0.236) (0.216) (0.686) 
Observations  98.000 98.000 98.000 98.000 98.000 
R-sq  0.659 0.661 0.686 0.671 0.706 
F instr  39.62 38.66 26.35 44.55 30.77 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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A.8 Infrastructure sector analysis (country level mean) 
A8.1: Infrastructure sector (country level mean): OLS estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.099** 0.085** 0.071* 0.052 0.097** 0.029 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.036) (0.040) (0.041) 
SSA 0.317* 0.237 0.359* 0.155 0.285 0.313 
 (0.177) (0.194) (0.193) (0.202) (0.200) (0.202) 
Distance -0.318** -0.313** -0.304** -0.316** -0.344** -0.332** 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.143) (0.141) (0.144) 
Landlocked -0.051 -0.030 0.017 -0.048 -0.019 0.014 
 (0.194) (0.195) (0.206) (0.196) (0.201) (0.211) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.167** 0.150** 0.176* 0.162** 0.154 
  (0.074) (0.072) (0.101) (0.071) (0.115) 
GDP   0.060**   0.078** 
   (0.030)   (0.034) 
Inflation    0.017*  0.025*** 
    (0.008)  (0.009) 
Polity     0.009 0.007 
     (0.010) (0.012) 
Constant 8.685*** 8.655*** 7.100*** 8.609*** 8.881*** 6.746*** 
 (1.248) (1.253) (1.624) (1.237) (1.217) (1.733) 
R2 0.097 0.111 0.134 0.140 0.117 0.189 
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
A8.2: Infrastructure sector (country level mean): Second step IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.107*** 0.094** 0.072* 0.067* 0.106*** 0.033 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.037) (0.039) (0.044) 
SSA 0.328* 0.227 0.330* 0.139 0.284 0.260 
 (0.173) (0.182) (0.180) (0.192) (0.187) (0.189) 
Distance -0.321** -0.316** -0.305** -0.319** -0.350*** -0.338** 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.139) (0.138) (0.134) (0.135) 
Landlocked -0.045 -0.011 0.027 -0.017 -0.002 0.033 
 (0.192) (0.193) (0.201) (0.193) (0.197) (0.203) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.230*** 0.216*** 0.285*** 0.209*** 0.283*** 
  (0.059) (0.057) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) 
GDP   0.057**   0.069** 
   (0.029)   (0.032) 
Inflation    0.015*  0.024** 
    (0.008)  (0.009) 
Polity     0.010 0.008 
     (0.009) (0.011) 
Constant 8.698*** 8.667*** 7.169*** 8.626*** 8.918*** 7.001*** 
 (1.214) (1.214) (1.549) (1.195) (1.163) (1.613) 
R2 0.097 0.108 0.132 0.131 0.115 0.181 
Observations 98 98 98 98 98 98 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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A.9 Infrastructure sector analysis (project level) 
A9.1: Infrastructure sector (project level): OLS estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.069** 0.051* 0.062* 0.032 0.049* 0.049 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.032) (0.025) (0.027) (0.031) 
SSA 0.316** 0.182 0.113 0.117 0.169 0.124 
 (0.147) (0.147) (0.170) (0.160) (0.159) (0.172) 
Distance -0.070 -0.061 -0.037 -0.073 -0.051 -0.100 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.125) (0.137) (0.126) 
Landlocked 0.012 0.060 0.041 0.054 0.058 0.048 
 (0.148) (0.153) (0.159) (0.166) (0.153) (0.170) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.111** 0.116** 0.131* 0.114** 0.124* 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.077) (0.051) (0.074) 
GDP   -0.031   -0.020 
   (0.032)   (0.031) 
Inflation    0.014  0.014 
    (0.009)  (0.009) 
Polity     -0.002 0.008 
     (0.009) (0.008) 
Constant 6.066*** 6.037*** 6.580*** 5.952*** 5.951*** 6.638*** 
 (1.182) (1.178) (1.215) (1.129) (1.228) (1.310) 
R2 0.037 0.043 0.046 0.058 0.044 0.059 
Observations 432 432 432 432 432 432 
Estimations are done using disaggregated FEE transactions to the infrastructure sector as the dependent 
variable. The variables FEE, Energy resources, Distance and GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in 
percentages. Institutions measured in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are binary variables. All 
estimations include i.year as a control variable. Standard errors clustered on country-level. Standard errors in 
parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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A9.2: Infrastructure sector (project level): Second step IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI $ FDI 
Energy resources 0.077** 0.058* 0.078** 0.042 0.057* 0.074* 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.030) (0.033) (0.040) 
SSA 0.330** 0.149 0.069 0.057 0.140 0.057 
 (0.141) (0.149) (0.172) (0.169) (0.164) (0.181) 
Distance -0.076 -0.068 -0.039 -0.081 -0.061 -0.111 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.127) (0.122) (0.132) (0.123) 
Landlocked 0.023 0.097 0.078 0.116 0.097 0.095 
 (0.147) (0.153) (0.160) (0.169) (0.154) (0.171) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
 0.157*** 0.161*** 0.209*** 0.159*** 0.188*** 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.052) (0.049) (0.053) 
GDP   -0.041   -0.041 
   (0.032)   (0.034) 
Inflation    0.014  0.013 
    (0.009)  (0.009) 
Polity     -0.001 0.012 
     (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 6.088*** 6.061*** 6.791*** 5.989*** 6.004*** 7.226*** 
 (1.155) (1.149) (1.165) (1.104) (1.189) (1.289) 
R2 0.037 0.042 0.044 0.053 0.042 0.054 
Observations 432 432 432 432 432 432 
Estimations are done using disaggregated FEE transactions to the infrastructure sector as the dependent 
variable. The variables FEE, Energy resources, Distance and GDP measured in ln. Inflation measured in 
percentages. Institutions measured in the range -10 to 10. Landlocked and SSA are binary variables.  All 
estimations include i.year as a control variable. Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
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A9.3: Infrastructure sector (project level): First step IV for Energy resources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy lnenergy 
Energy resources 
1980 
0.981*** 0.960*** 0.994*** 0.922*** 0.913*** 0.859*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.058) (0.053) (0.049) (0.066) 
       
Energy resources 
1980 * SSA 
 0.183** 0.199*** 0.317*** 0.286*** 0.369*** 
  (0.076) (0.074) (0.093) (0.066) (0.084) 
Observations 432 432 432 432 432 432 
R-sq 0.881 0.883 0.886 0.898 0.902 0.910 
F instr 370.37 326.09 214.03 318.04 477.03 198.77 
First step estimations for lnenergy variable in infrastructure sector estimations using disaggregated FEE 
transactions as the dependent variable. Estimations include the following control variables: Distance, 
Landlocked, GDP, Inflation, Institutions, SSA and i.year. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
A9.4: Infrastructure sector (project level): First step IV for SSA*Energy resources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ssaenerg ssaenerg ssaenerg ssaenerg ssaenerg 
Energy resources 
1980 
 -0.013* -0.017* -0.034** -0.023* -0.079*** 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.027) 
       
Energy resources 
1980 * SSA 
 1.159*** 1.157*** 1.235*** 1.183*** 1.253*** 
  (0.059) (0.060) (0.076) (0.053) (0.070) 
       
Observations  432.000 432.000 432.000 432.000 432.000 
R-sq  0.853 0.853 0.879 0.858 0.890 
F instr  203.89 203.87 152.11 252.15 162.18 
First step estimations for ssaenergy variable in infrastructure sector estimations using disaggregated FEE 
transactions as the dependent variable. Estimations include the following control variables: Distance, 
Landlocked, GDP, Inflation, Institutions, SSA and i.year. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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A.10 Excluding Nigeria 
Table A10.1: Excluding Nigeria 
 Full sample Infrastructure 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Energy resources 0.206** 0.524 0.101 0.283 
 (0.086) (1.669) (0.085) (0.896) 
Energy resources * 
SSA 
-0.061 4.861 0.049 2.312 
 (0.243) (23.457) (0.222) (12.135) 
SSA 0.739** 0.020 0.639* 0.329 
 (0.325) (3.497) (0.350) (1.874) 
Distance -0.262 -0.346 -0.502** -0.585 
 (0.243) (0.493) (0.239) (0.428) 
Landlocked 0.090 0.493 -0.272 -0.020 
 (0.345) (2.027) (0.310) (1.367) 
GDP 0.408*** 0.184 0.228*** 0.109 
 (0.070) (1.156) (0.069) (0.620) 
Inflation 0.032** -0.051 0.038** -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.440) (0.016) (0.235) 
Polity -0.018 0.022 -0.020 0.002 
 (0.021) (0.200) (0.022) (0.112) 
Constant -0.106 6.212 5.649* 9.283 
 (2.926) (32.660) (2.941) (18.719) 
R2 0.372 -0.306 0.278 0.026 
Observations 120 120 97 97 
F instr. lnenergy 
            ssaenergy 
 107.38 
3.25 
 93.24 
3.23 
Aggregated data (sum). Robust standard errors.Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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